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INTRODUCTION

How much are you worth? Employers ask that question before offering
employment to potential employees. Investors ask that before deciding to invest
their assets and savings in the market. The boards of directors for public
corporations ask that before approving compensation packages for company
executives. . . or do they? Is it not true that the directors of the corporation should
ask that question and engage in detailed cost benefit analysis to fulfill their duties
of care and loyalty to the company’s shareholders? Is it not true that the more
money an executive receives, the less there is available to distribute in dividends or
capital gains to the owners of the corporation?
In a perfect world, every dollar and other form of compensation paid to
management, whether as simple as an annual contracted salary or complex as
deferred stock option grants, would go through extensive cost-basis analysis by the
compensation committee of a board of directors. It is, after all, the fiduciary duty
of the board to ensure that management work to achieving the best results for the
shareholders. Instead, over the last forty years numerous factors have led to less
oversight and control over executive compensation. It now stampedes towards
infinity. “The objectives of the firm are to benefit stockholders by attracting
capital, performing efficiently and profitably, and complying with the law.”1 That
statement, made by a former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court in an
Article written after he retired from the bench, seems to lose its meaning when
examining the excessive amount of compensation that executives of publicly
traded companies receive. Managers have utilized the same abilities required to
maximize the resources and assets of the firm in their approach to maximizing
their own compensation.2
With the advent and growth of the Internet, lawmakers and other regulators
must recognize the potential influence the medium can have on corporate
communication and policymaking. Recent changes in many areas of law reflect
the new awareness, but those in control of regulating the process remain hesitant to

1
E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. DiGugliemlo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law
and Governance From 1992–2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV.
1399, 1411 (2005).
2
Charles M. Yablon, Bonus Questions: Executive Compensation in the Era of Pay for
Performance, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 271, 273 (1999).
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open the door to shareholders.3
This paper examines the executive
overcompensation problem in America, and how new mediums of communication
and other resources available to Congress, the Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC), and shareholders can ensure that corporations work to serve the interests of
their true owners. Part II will begin by examining the executive overcompensation
problem, from its humble beginnings to where we are now, and provide analysis
and theories for why the problem occurs.
Part III will examine the role of the SEC and its obligations to monitor and
regulate corporations so they will not take advantage of the capital provided to
them by shareholders. Furthermore, it will provide a detailed analysis of the proxy
process, including the new Internet-availability rules. The section will also discuss
how the SEC failed to take the necessary steps to allow shareholders to benefit
from the proxy reform, and provide analysis of future implications due to that
inaction. Part IV will examine how previous attempts by the SEC and Congress
have failed to control executive compensation. Part V will examine how
shareholders, through the proxy system and the new Internet-availability
provisions, appear to be the key to controlling executive overcompensation. This
section will serve to tie the discussed concepts into a coherent argument for
increased shareholder power.
II.

EXECUTIVE OVERCOMPENSATION

One of the most recognizable phrases acknowledging the perception of a
potentially catastrophic problem came from the movie Apollo 13: “Houston, we
have a problem.”4 The phrase signifies the realization that a situation exists that is
so out of control and presents such an imminent threat to continuing existence that
extensive, decisive, and timely action is required to avert dire consequences. It
connects with people of all ages, including those born and raised during the era of
Project Apollo at NASA, and to younger generations that experienced the epic
event through cinema. To a lesser degree, and to a more limited audience, the term
“executive compensation” has begun to develop the same connotation. When
hearing the term, those familiar with the circumstances think of grossly excessive
and unjustified pay packages that have been the subject of congressional hearings,
scholarly articles, research projects, newspaper discussions, and—most
importantly— shareholder outrage.
Therefore, as executive compensation
continues to grow, its effects and connotation might begin to resonate with a wider
audience.
There are some—aptly named “marketeers”—that believe any discussion
regarding limiting compensation through policy reform is unnecessary, instead

3

See discussion infra Part III.D.
During the actual mission, Pilot Jack Swigert stated, “Houston, we’ve had a problem here,”
followed by a response from the Houston Control Center, and a follow up by Captain James Lovell, Jr.,
“Houston, we’ve had a problem.” Phrase Finder, http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/188425.html
(last visited Mar. 8, 2008). For dramatic purposes, Director Ron Howard shortened to the more
poignant “Houston, we have a problem.” See Apollo 13: 2-Disc Anniversary Edition (Disc 1), Special
Features:Commentary track by Jim and Marilyn Lovell [DVD].
4
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believing that the market will dictate and determine the appropriate controls.5
Although this traditionally conservative market-based view works for establishing
the value of stocks and bonds in capital markets that are efficient, it has proven to
be inadequate at controlling executives’ compensation. Specifically, for stocks of
publicly traded companies, the market approach works because there are two
parties with equal bargaining power, a wide range of information, and indexes that
provide real-time updates on sales of similar type. Thus, the law of supply and
demand holds.6 However, regarding executive compensation, a Chief Executive
Officer (CEO) exercises tremendous leverage over the board of directors,
sometimes sitting on the board himself, in determining his and other executives’
compensation packages.7 The idea that the market will dictate the appropriate
result regarding executive compensation is inadequate because regulators have not
established the foundation for fair market control.8
Two recent examples exemplify the problem. One must only examine the
pay received by Stanley O’Neal,9 former chairman and CEO of Merrill Lynch,10
and Charles Prince,11 former CEO at Citigroup,12 after they stepped down from
their respective positions. Regarding Mr. O’Neal, he resigned from a company
that lost $8 billion dollars due to losses incurred relating to subprime mortgage
investments.13 A reasonable person would assume that if his company he managed
just experienced enormous losses over the past year, that he would not receive
millions of dollars in compensation. But that is where reason abandons practice.
Not admitting he obtained a windfall while his company suffered through horrible
investment consequences and in arguing that his $161 million pay package was
appropriate, O’Neal blamed the media for releasing inaccurate reports of his
compensation, further stating that the board of directors had determined his pay
after fair negotiations. 14 Never did he offer to disclose the “true” amount he

5
See Susan Lorde Martin, Executive Compensation: Reining in Runaway Abuses—Again, 41
U.S.F. L. REV. 147, 157–58 (2006).
6
See generally Nell Minow, Should Shareholders Have a Say on Pay?—Yes, INVESTMENTNEWS,
May 21, 2007, available at http://www.investmentnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070521/
FREE/70518004/1011 (stating that even “passionate” capitalists should recognize the potential
influence shareholders could have on dictating pay terms for executives).
7
See discussion infra Part II.B.
8
This topic will be discussed at length in Part III regarding the SEC’s role in regulating and
ensuring a fair market.
9
O’Neal obtained his M.B.A. from Harvard Business School in 1978. Harvard Business School
Bulletin, Profile on Stanley O’Neal, http://www.alumni.hbs.edu/bulletin/2001/june/profile.html (last
visited Mar. 8, 2008). He was the first in his family to graduate from college. Id.
10
NYSE Ticker: MER.
11
Prince obtained his B.A., M.B.A., and J.D. from the University of Southern California. Forbes,
Charles Prince Profile, http://people.forbes.com/profile/charles-prince/46497 (last visited Apr. 1, 2009).
He serves in a managerial or directorial role for many other companies and charitable organizations,
including Johnson & Johnson, where he serves on the Compensation & Benefits Committee and the
Nominating & Corporate Governance Committee. Id. He remains a member of the board for
Citigroup. Id.
12
NYSE Ticker: C.
13
David Ellis, Mortgage Mess CEOs Defend Pay, CNNMONEY.COM, http://money.cnn.com/2008/
03/07/news/newsmakers/ceo_pay/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
14
Id.
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received after stating the media had reported an incorrect figure. Regardless, it is
safe to assume that Mr. O’Neal received millions.
Citigroup’s CEO Charles Prince stepped down after his company posted a
fifty-seven percent drop in quarterly earnings, lost nearly a quarter of its market
value, and gave up a large amount of market share to competitors. Instead of
anticipating how it would defend a possible derivative action by shareholders who
lost thousands of dollars from their portfolios and 401(k) plans, or preparing to
disseminate news releases regarding how it prepared to make changes in the
following quarter, Citigroup’s board gave its departing CEO a pat on the back with
one hand and stuffed a mere $68 million in his pocket for his outstanding efforts.15
These two situations, and the many like them, are unreasonable and
unethical, and they should trigger the feelings of inequity and unfairness that all
people—save executives of public corporations—should develop through their
lifetimes. Boards owe more to their shareholders, who happen to be their bosses,
sources of capital, and reason for existing,16 but, unfortunately, such apathy exists
on many boards, and circumstances in which a company posted an enormous loss
but gave excessive pay to their CEOs is commonplace.17 Boards have lost or
chosen not to exercise their ability to maintain proper oversight. Now, after
examining two not-so-unusual incidents regarding excessive executive pay in
America, and noting how it affects normal shareholders, it seems more appropriate
to realign the connotation we associated with the term “executive compensation”
into the same category as “Houston, we have a problem.” Without decisive action,
the consequences could be overwhelming.
A. Brief History
At the beginning of the Twentieth Century, the executive overcompensation
problem did not exist because of the way businesses, the financial markets, and the
economy were structured.18 As the economy developed, however, and the
corporate form became prevalent, the times and norms began changing. As a
result, the idea of separating control of the entity from ownership became reality.19
With this separation of control, a new and very ominous agency problem came into
being. In turn, this agency problem became a leading reason that executives have
the ability to influence their compensation. To regulate the power that managers
have in the absence of ownership monitoring and control, several procedural and

15

Id.
See Carol J. Loomis, This Stuff Is Wrong, FORTUNE, June 25, 2001, at 72.
17
Including those executives earlier mentioned, the names Eisner and Grasso invoke visions of
pinnacle examples of excessive executive pay. There are many others, though; so many that a list
would continue for pages.
18
Yablon, supra note 2, at 275.
19
Id. at 276; see also ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (Translation Publishers 1932). Berle and Means’ book led the surge in scholarship
for identifying the new way corporate America would function. It also served as basis for most
discussions in Business Organizations classes that discuss the issues presented by the new mode of
business. See also discussion infra Part II.B.1.
16
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regulatory safeguards came into being, including the SEC.20
In 1950, a significant change occurred that allowed companies to pay
executives and other employees with stock options.21 This change to the Internal
Revenue Code, signed into law by President Truman, is another major reason for
why we have our current problem. In the initial years after the change in the law,
however, specifically from the early 1950s to the middle 1970s, executive pay
grew at a slower rate than regular employee wages.22 Thus, either companies had
not learned the best way to use the options, or directors were still able and willing
to negotiate with executives over reasonable figures. During that same time,
especially in the 1960s, the economy saw an increase in conglomerate mergers,
which led to many companies having nearly unmanageable resources, but in turn,
more willingness to provide higher compensation to executives.23 The logical flow
seems to be there: higher responsibilities, higher pay. However, once pay started
going up, it never stopped going. This fact, combined with the stagnate stock
market which led to companies beginning to take advantage of their ability to pay
with options, set the foundation for the current pay situation.24 Still, although
executives received higher salaries than did the rank-and-file workers, the rapid
jump and continuing rise of compensation levels of which we are now accustomed
to seeing today was not present during that time.
Moving along in the century, executive compensation packages were of
major concern in the late 80s—especially during the hostile takeover era—but
shareholders took limited action to attempt to control wages. “As business became
glamorized in the 1980s, CEOs realized that being famous was more fun than
being invisible. . . . Instead of being embarrassed by their appearance near the top
of published CEO pay rankings, many CEOs began to consider it a badge of
honor.”25 The pay packages represented an accurate portrayal of the culture that
existed during the decade. It truly was the “Me! Me! Me! generation of status
seekers.”26 One of the most enduring and recognizable songs from the decade
represented the prevailing attitude of American culture: Material Girl by
Madonna.27 Somehow surviving both the music and self-indulgence attitude of
that period, and by the time President Ronald Reagan was set to exit the Oval
Office in 1988, the economy showed signs of recession, which made business
reporters, shareholders, and Congress examine executive payouts.28 Continued
scrutiny continued to the early 1990s, where political candidates stumped about

20

See Yablon, supra note 2, at 276; discussion infra Part III.A.
Geoffrey Colvin et al., The Great CEO Pay Heist, FORTUNE, June 25, 2001, at 64.
22
Id.
23
Yablon, supra note 2, at 277.
24
Colvin et al., supra note 21, at 64.
25
Id.
26
Kingwood College Library, American Cultural History: 1980–1989, http://kclibrary.lonestar.
edu/decade80.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
27
MADONNA, Material Girl, on LIKE A VIRGIN (Warner Bros. 1984). The chorus so aptly
describes the situation: “Living in a material world; And I am a material girl; You know that we are
living in a material world; And I am a material girl.” Id.
28
SARAH ANDERSON ET AL., EXECUTIVE EXCESS 2003: CEOS WIN, WORKERS AND TAXPAYERS
LOSE 3 (2003), available at http://www.faireconomy.org/files/pdf/Executive_Excess_2003.pdf.
21
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passing legislation to control out-of-control executive pay packages.29 However,
through the middle 1990s and because of the astonishing bull market conditions,
albeit mainly built on the bubble of the volatile high-technology industry, those
same shareholders and politicians that voiced concerns in the late 1980s and early
1990s seemed to lose interest in their attempts to limit executive compensation.30
Human nature explains the response, or lack of response: as long as shareholders’
dividends were high, they cared little about the compensation of those who seemed
in control and responsible for those gains.31 That represents the ultimate “what
have you done for me lately” attitude that began to take over in the decade. “In the
late 1990s, as the stock market took off, CEOs became modern-day heroes. Few
really seemed to mind that CEO pay was rising much faster than worker pay, much
faster even than corporate profits or the stock market.”32 After the recession in
2002 and continued economic instability that has followed, the attention has once
again turned to controlling executive compensation. If we enter a bull economy in
the near future, it is very likely the problem will continue with no answers in sight.
Since the late 1980s, executive pay levels have done nothing but
dramatically increase, even through periods of recession in 2001 and 200233 and
notwithstanding tax law changes and increased emphasis on more detailed
disclosure to shareholders.34 Interestingly, the jump in compensation levels came
partly due to an influx of equity-based packages.35 Although firm size increased,
“compensation levels increased far beyond what can be attributed to changes in
size and performance.”36 In 10 years, from 1995 to 2005, average CEO pay
increased by over 100%, with 60% of the jump having no rational basis.37 In
2006, the average salary for a CEO of an S&P 500 firm was $15.06 million,
representing an 11.5% increase over 2005.38 The question becomes what has
happened since the turn of the 20th Century. Running a business in a way that
ownership is separated from control has become the norm for success; why, then,
have executive compensation packages continued to rise at extraordinary levels?

29
See, e.g., Bill Clinton for President 1992 Campaign Brochures, available at
http://www.4president.org/brochures/billclinton1992brochure.htm
(“Eliminate
deductions
for
companies that . . . reward outrageous executive pay.”); see also Martin, supra note 5, at 148
(“Executive compensation became an issue for the candidates in the 1992 presidential campaign.”).
30
See Janice Kay McClendon, Bringing the Bulls to Bear: Regulating Executive Compensation to
Realign Management and Shareholders’ Interests and Promote Corporate Long-Term Productivity, 39
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 971, 972 (2004); see also SARAH ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 28, at 3.
31
McClendon, supra note 30, at 972.
32
SARAH ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 28, at 3.
33
See Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD REV. OF
ECO. POL’Y 283, 285, 289 (2005).
34
See discussion infra Parts IV.A–B.
35
Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note 33, at 291. As this paper will discuss later, it appears that this
jump in equity-based compensation resulted directly from efforts by Congress to control executives’
pay through the Internal Revenue Code. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
36
Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note 33, at 286.
37
Id. at 287.
38
AFL-CIO, 2006 TRENDS IN CEO PAY (2007), http://www.aflcio.org/corporatewatch/paywatch/
pay/index.cfm?RenderForPrint=1 (last visited Mar. 31, 2008) (citing numbers from THE CORPORATE
LIBRARY'S ANNUAL CEO PAY SURVEY 2007 (Corporate Library 2007)).
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B. The Failure of the Corporate Board
It is impossible to identify one source or dispositive factor that has led to the
undesired developments in corporate America. According to Warren Buffet,
executive pay is the acid test for determining whether the American financial
markets can monitor and reform themselves.39 If this indeed is true, our markets
are inflated, misleading, and working adverse to those who participate in them. It
also indicates that, although no one factor is dispositive, the continued failure of
the corporate board to work in shareholders’ interests is the leading factor to
executive overcompensation. Due to of the nature of ownership of public
companies in America,40 corporate boards, due to the legal principles preventing
active shareholder intervention, have significant power.41 These boards, however,
still are unable or unwilling to negotiate at arm’s length with executives regarding
pay packages.42
1. Agency Issues
Many argue that executive overcompensation is a result of an agency
problem, which is a perfectly logical conclusion. Adolph Berle and Gardiner
Means first addressed this issue, specifically targeting problems inherent with
separating ownership from control, in the 1930s,43 but the principles and ideas they
developed remain practical today. Succinctly, the “[n]on-owner managers may be
tempted to maximize their own welfare rather than the profits of the firm that
employs them, preferring themselves over the shareholders who own the firm.”44
It is impossible to avoid this situation, primarily due to the large amount of
business conducted and obligations involved in day-to-day business. The oldfashioned-individually-owned establishments that existed during the 1800s and
early 1900s could no longer compete with businesses that moved to the corporate
form and ownership through dispersed shareholders. Although shown that the
corporate form provides a way to conduct efficient business transactions, which in
turn creates economic advantages,45 some negative consequences exist.
With this type of business, the managers who run operations from day-to-day
should act as agents for the firm, but they have other incentives to maximize their
own interests.46 Additionally, the problem of shirking causes those in charge to do

39

Letter from Warren Buffett to Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. (Feb. 2004).
See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
41
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Reply, Letting Shareholers Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784 (2006).
42
AM. FED’N OF STATE, COUNTY & MUN. EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO & THE CORPORATE LIBRARY,
ENABLERS OF EXCESS: MUTUAL FUNDS & THE OVERPAID AMERICAN CEO 3 (2006),
http://www.aflcio.org/corporatewatch/capital/upload/enablersofexcess.pdf.
43
BERLE & MEANS, supra note 19.
44
Henry N. Butler & Fred S. McChesney, Why They Give at the Office: Shareholder Welfare and
Corporate Philanthropy in the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1195,
1198–99 (1999).
45
Id. at 1197. Many factors exist for why the corporate form is better suited for large business,
namely limited liability for the owners and perpetual life if all continues to go well.
46
Id. at 1199.
40
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as little as possible and still get the job done.47 Both in turn affect how different
groups, in this case management and shareholders, perceive different projects, with
the former preferring to maximize short-term wealth to ensure their continued
employment, and the latter preferring to maximize long-term stability to ensure a
reasonable return on their investment. Shareholders desire management to engage
in activities that increase overall firm profitability, but these actions may not result
in the immediate profits for which are required in management-driven
compensation plans. Thus, management has an incentive to do as little as possible
while still maintaining short-term profitability of the firm.48 Scholars have long
argued whether security regulations, legal doctrines, or private agreements can best
reduce the divergence in interests between the managers and shareholders, and the
debate continues with no single theory better than the next.49 What is certain is
that the agency problem is significant. It affects how managers determine the
extent of their efforts to produce profits for the corporation, which business
opportunities to engage the firm in, and, most importantly for this paper, how
managers bargain—or dictate terms—with corporate boards regarding
compensation.50
State corporate law statutes design corporate boards to prevent the exact
types of actions listed above by giving them control over ratifying and monitoring
company executives and other fundamental transactions.51 Accordingly, by law,
boards must make decisions to ensure corporate efficiency and ensure corporate
assets are used to benefit shareholders.52 However, boards often do not have the
ability to engage in effective monitoring that would benefit the shareholders. Most
members have other jobs that require their full attention, and corporate business
falls on the scale of priorities; further, some members serve on multiple boards in
addition to full time jobs.53 Because of that, increasing passivity prevails on
boards at every publicly traded company in America.54 “Management, no longer
checked, freely engages in conduct that is slothful, ill-directed, or self-dealing—all
to the corporation’s detriment.”55

47
Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 64 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 877, 887 (2007).
48
See Martin, supra note 5, at 153–54 (quoting Adam Smith, who, in 1776, recognized the
problems created by the divergent interests of two parties in business).
49
See, e.g., id. (discussing the contractual theory); MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF
THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS (1976) (discussing the need for legal intervention); BERLE &
MEANS, supra note 19, at 233–40 (discussing needed regulations to control corporate managers). These
three works span across sixty-seven years of economic and corporate theory, yet we still encounter
problems that pre-existed each work.
50
See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 16 (2004).
51
Butler & McChesney, supra note 44, at 1201.
52
Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-Captured Board—The History
of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 S.M.U. L. REV. 127, 128 (1996).
53
BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 50, at 17.
54
Elson, supra note 52, at 128.
55
Id.
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2. Managerial Power Theory
A leading theory for explaining why corporate boards fail to control
executives is the product of Professors Lucian Bebchuk 56 and Jesse Fried;57 it
emphasizes the concept that management exercises unchecked power in
negotiations with the board, and directors’ interest lies with the CEO and not to the
corporation.58 Included in this theory is the recognition that directors, realizing
their fate relates directly to the personal relationship they have with the CEO, seek
to please management to ensure sustainability of their position.59 Managers use
their power to overcome the proper arm’s length bargaining over compensation,
which requires directors to disguise excessive compensation amounts from
shareholders by camouflaging the payments as stock options and other deferred
compensation.60 The point of hiding the excessive payments is to limit the
“outrage” (as Bebchuk and Fried call it) by shareholders when they realize what
the executives have received.61 The theory holds that the only true restraint on
executive compensation is shareholder outrage.
The theory suggests that executive overcompensation occurs because passive

56

From his biography on the Harvard Law School website:
Professor Bebchuk is the William J. Friedman and Alicia Townsend Friedman
Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance and Director of the Program on
Corporate Governance at Harvard Law School. Bebchuk is a Research Associate
of the National Bureau of Economic Research and Inaugural Fellow of the
European Corporate Governance Network.
Trained in both law and economics, Bebchuk holds an LL.M. and S.J.D. from
Harvard Law School and an M.A. and Ph.D in Economics from the Harvard
Economics Department. He joined the Harvard Law School faculty in 1986 as an
assistant professor, becoming a full professor in 1988, and the Friedman
Professor of Law, Economics and Finance in 1998.
Bebchuk's research focuses on corporate governance, law and finance, and law
and economics, and he has published more than seventy research articles in
academic journals in law, economics, and finance.
Harvard Law School’s Faculty Biographies, http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/bio.shtml
(last visited Mar. 29, 2008).
57
From his biography at the University of California School of Law:
Jesse M. Fried is a Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley,
and Faculty Co-Director of the Berkeley Center for Law, Business and the
Economy (BCLBE). He holds an A.B. and A.M in Economics from Harvard
University, and a J.D. from Harvard Law School. Fried joined the Berkeley
faculty in 1997 following two years in practice and a two-year Olin Fellowship at
Harvard Law School.
Fried's main areas of research are executive compensation, corporate governance,
corporate bankruptcy and venture capital.
UC Berkeley School of Law, http://www.law.berkeley.edu/faculty/friedj/homepage.htm (last visited
Mar. 29, 2008).
58
BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 50, at 61–79; see also Michael B. Dorff, The Group Dynamics
Theory of Executive Compensation, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2025, 2028 (2007) (outlining and describing
the managerial power theory); Polsky, supra note 47, at 890–91 (explaining how the arm’s length
model and Managerial Power Model are products of the agency problem).
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BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 50, at 80–86.
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Id. at 61, 67.
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Id. at 64.

2009

EXECUTIVE OVERCOMPENSATION

283

boards agree to salary packages without the semblance of objective discussion,62
and then try to cover for their laziness by camouflaging payments.63 The directors,
even those on the compensation committees, are self-admittedly “‘in the pocket of
the CEOs’” and never engage in arm’s length bargaining.64 Undoubtedly, this
invites CEOs to dictate terms to the board. Further complicating the problem,
CEOs usually sit on the boards for which they are supposedly “bargaining” with
over compensation.65 Nothing could represent a higher level of conflicting
interests, especially given the amount of money and other capital assets public
corporations have at their disposal.66
Another way in which managerial power influences pay is that the law, by
allowing for various anti-takeover measures and other obstacles, insulates
managers from potential removal.67 With no plausible threat of removal due to
poor performance by directors, outsiders, or even shareholders, management has
no other reasons or influences to make them take lower pay.68 Thus, anyone that
would potentially challenge an excessive pay package can do nothing but wait for
the executive to leave.69 Assuming one had the ability to challenge, “[S]ince at
least the 1960s courts have been far more deferential to the board’s decision to
enter such [compensation] contracts” even if evidence exists of hardly objective
bargaining.70 It is a circular analysis, with the conclusions ending the same every
time: executives take home millions, directors maintain the status quo, and
shareholders receive less for their investment. Additionally, the legal ramifications
surrounding board passivity are either insignificant or non-existent. Provided
companies disclose all compensation in their public filings,71 and the board of

62
Susan J. Stabile, One for A, Two for B, and Four Hundred for C: The Widening Gap in Pay
Between Executives and Rank and File Employees, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 115, 128 (2002)
(“executive ‘overcompensation is basically the fault of passive boards that agree to salary packages on
demand, without spirited negotiations’”).
63
BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 50, at 68. The camouflaging of benefits can come through
granting equity instruments or it can come in the form of lucrative retirement packages. Id. at 95–111.
Furthermore, the hidden benefits can come in the form of loans to executives, even though provisions in
Sarbanes-Oxley bar their use. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k) (2008). Existing loans at the time of the prohibition,
however, are exempted from this ban. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 50, at 112.
64
Stabile, supra note 62, at 128.
65
See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 50, at 38–41.
66
Not only do executives exercise a great amount of control during their negotiations, some have a
great amount of control over who will be their successor. See, e.g., Kip Walton, Disney Sues Disney:
Shareholders After Another Election, DAILY FIN. NEWS, May 10, 2005, http://www.dailyfinancenews.
com/Disney-Sues-Disney_s757.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2008) (discussing how ousted CEO Michael
Eisner handpicked his successor, whom the board voted for with no questions asked). Therefore,
shareholders can go through the painstaking effort and costs associated with a proxy contest only to
have the management or board member they somehow remove pick his successor.
67
BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 50, at 83–85 (referring to Poison Pills).
68
See id. at 45–46. Why would anyone take lower pay when what they make is legal and for what
was “negotiated?” If we were to accept the notion of proper negotiation, this paper would be as useless
as a politician’s promises.
69
See generally id. at 45–52 (describing the limited power shareholders have to intervene in the
corporate affairs of a publicly traded business).
70
Aaron D. Jones, Corporate Officer Wrongdoing and the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Officers
Under Delaware Law, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 475, 501 (2007).
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See discussion infra part IV.A.
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directors does not engage in gross misconduct that would give rise to liability,72
executives and directors are truly free to do whatever they please.
Though the managerial power theory seems to address why executives are
able to obtain such high pay packages, some believe that the only problem is the
inability of directors and compensation committees to negotiate in the best
interests of the corporation.73 Although this theory ignores the reality that these
same directors have well-developed negotiating and analytical skills, especially
when it comes to allocating resources, large contracts, and general business
techniques, the end results are still the same as with the Managerial Power Theory:
the executives have all the control and power in the board room.74 “To break
management’s grip on the board and stimulate real oversight, an appeal must be
made to the director’s same sense of personal self-interest,”75 pride, or security, all
of which management currently controls. Until there is a major change, in either
the law or the governance structure of corporations, the problems will continue to
exist.
3. Group Dynamics Theory
In recent years, the executive compensation problem has received attention
from psychologists to determine what exactly causes the lack of bargaining. This
is much more theoretical than the Managerial Power Theory because it bases not
on specific tendencies of management or boards, but on examining general human
tendencies. The Group Dynamics Theory opines that executive overcompensation
occurs as result of a flaw within a group’s psychological behavior.76 Because the
group—board of directors—desires to act as a cohesive unit, any decisions,
whether major or minor, become products of “groupthink;” however, management
does not exercise the degree of control as suggested with the Managerial Power
Theory, but simply manipulates the group in one way or another.77 Groupthink is
a phenomenon that can best be quantified by examining a group of people with
similar interests all wanting to make a process run smoothly, so each member
agrees on uniform terms, even though some member had some objections to the
result. This process is used to ensure and facilitate unanimous “clubby”
decisions.78 Another interpretation, more simply stated, is that this phenomenon is
the “good old boy” theory. The executive neither dominates nor dictates terms to

72
Jones, supra note 70, at 477; see infra note 240 and accompanying text. Examples from
Delaware Law are used because most companies referred to herein are incorporated in Delaware.
73
See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen , Kevin J. Murphy & Eric G. Wruck, Remuneration: Where We’ve
Been, How We Got Here, What Are the Problems, and How to Fix Them 53 (Harvard Fin., Working
Paper No. 44-2004, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=561305
(“poor negotiating expertise on the part of remuneration committees may explain more of the increase
than captive board members catering to entrenched managers”).
74
See id. at 54; BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 50, at 24–30.
75
Elson, supra note 52, at 133.
76
Dorff, supra note 58, at 2029.
77
Id. at 2030.
78
IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES
247 (2d. ed. 1982).
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the board, but simply becomes such a part of the group that all decisions receive
glossy analysis.79 The foundation is there, and “[g]roupthink seems likely to
develop on many corporate boards,”80 mainly due to the members homogeneous
composition.81
In this situation, it is not that the executives force directors into making poor
decisions, but that the pressure to act as a uniform group makes the board decide as
it does. Thus, the Group Dynamics Theory does share some attributes with the
Managerial Power Theory, most notably that the results are the same: executives
receive excessive payments without the arm’s length bargaining process.
Furthermore, this theory recognizes that directors, provide they, in the first place,
would engage in objective bargaining, “have little incentive to spend time working
through the details of a complex compensation package, much less to dream up
alternatives to the traditional forms of compensation.”82 This is due to the
overarching intent of following the group. Not one director wants to cause unrest
by going against the unanimity.83 Thus, the status quo remains as such and the
lemmings march on.
4. Other Possible Explanations and Justifications
There are several practical explanations why executives receive lucrative pay
packages without the benefit of objective analysis, but they all share some
similarities with ideas established in the Managerial Power and Group Dynamics
Theories. One must only examine the structure and nature of a publicly traded
corporation to obtain an idea of why the problem exists. Because of the wide
dispersion of shareholders, a power vacuum exists within a corporation, and
regardless of whether company executives seek control of the board, because of
this vacuum, the default system is one where the CEO dominates the board.84 This
domination is not because the executive intends to dominate the board, or because
the group believes it to be the simplest and easiest way to run the company, but it
happens as part of the natural human behavior. Again, there are aspects of the
governance system that tend to favor this outcome. Mainly, executives maintain
domination and control over the proxy process thereby handcuffing the
shareholders from the ability to exercise any governing power.85 Even recognizing
this as a leading factor turns one to recognize that there is a failure on the part of
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Dorff, supra note 58, at 2036.
Id. at 2038.
81
Id. at 2038–39 n.72 (citing KORN/FERRY INTERNATIONAL, ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS
STUDY 10 (2003)). “Public company boards overwhelmingly consist of white, middle-aged men from
privileged backgrounds who have spent their careers working for large corporations.” Id.
82
Id. at 2045.
83
Id.
84
See Marcel Kahan, The Limited Significance of Norms for Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L.
REV. 1869, 1891 (2001).
85
See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Response to Increasing Shareholder Power: Toward a True Corporate
Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1775 (2006) (noting that proxy contests are so expensive, yet the board and
incumbent management have unlimited access to the company’s coffers).
80
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the SEC. Of course, extending the blame further for the sake of finding some
reason to point to would extend into criticizing and seeking reform of the laissez
faire approach in the American market economy. This, however, would be
complete overkill.
Proponents of another theory, the Optimal Contracting Theory, opine that
because public corporations generate mass sums of money and resources,
payments to executives indicate an efficient use of the ability to contract with those
that will produce a return on assets.86 Thus, provided the corporation is doing
well, any pay structure negotiated, used in the loosest sense of the word, with the
executives are efficient and appropriate. This theory also goes to argue that the
skills, knowledge, and abilities of top-performing CEOs makes them a scarce
resource, in fact, such a scarce resource that companies, acting through their
boards, should be willing to pay what the market dictates to retain their valuable
commodities.87 Those that argue executive compensation is not a problem,
provided it is the result of a negotiated contract in the best interests of the
corporation, prefer this approach. Again, though, we must go back and look at the
true essence of the agreements to determine if there is fair negotiation. If it really
is an optimal contract, why do the executives still make millions when the
companies struggle?
Still yet, another justification comes from the responsibilities and risks of the
executive position itself. Recently ousted from his position as CEO at Vivendi
Universal and shamed by accusations that he engaged in fraud, Jean-Marie Messier
stated before agreeing to serve in that position, “The possibility of being fired by
one’s shareholders, whether as a result of a takeover or for any other reason, is one
of the risks of being a chief executive. We are paid for that. And well paid.”88 He
went on to describe that he would never ask for excessive payments when he left
his position, but two years later, his attitude changed, and he asked for millions in a
severance agreement.89 It is true that executives should receive some type of risk
premium because their jobs are not as secure,90 but this argument falters for two
reasons. First, executives have just as much job security as any other ordinary
employee, and second, studies suggest that job security is not as important of a
factor to employees, including executives.91 Why should executives receive a
premium for an issue they do not consider important in deciding where to work?
However, that has become a given in the current pay structures and likely not to
change.
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FIN. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2003, at 13.
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C. Lasting Effects
1. Rank-and-File Inferiority Complex
As executive pay continues to rise, there is an undeniable realization that the
rank-and-file employees will begin to feel inferior in their place in the companies.
Stated otherwise, the people who actively engaged the public to facilitate the
revenue for the company they work for are being left far behind in terms of pay,
resulting in feelings that the company does not appreciate their efforts and takes
advantage of their abilities. We must only look at the differences in pay between
the rank-and-file employees and executives. The CEO-worker pay gap in 2002
was 282–1, 7 times larger than the ratio of 42–1 in 1982.92 Even more drastically,
the CEO-worker pay ratio in 2000 was an astounding 531–1.93 Though that ratio
decreased in years where the American economy struggled thereby indicating
some type of reality check on the executives, the differences are still staggering.
For a more realistic and quantifiable analysis, compare the growth numbers in
executive pay to that of the salaries of ordinary employees, specifically focusing
on the minimum wage for ease. “If the federal minimum wage, which stood at
$3.80 an hour in 1990, had grown at the same rate as CEO pay, it would have been
$14.40 in 2002 instead of $5.15.”94 That figure is astonishing, especially given
that it represents a number that is six years old.
Not only are executives making money at an exponentially greater level than
the rank-and-file employees are, but they have proven that, when circumstances
show impending financial disaster, the executives are more than happy to allow the
rank-and-file employees to bear the burden and heartache of experiencing the fall
of the company. Specifically, during the Enron crisis, company executives were
liquidating their portfolios while the rank-and-file employees were doing all they
could to fill up their 401(k) assets with the same Enron stock insiders knew was
worth less than the paper in the recycling bins.95
The immediate question is whether executives are truly a valuable
commodity that corporations should be paying hundreds of millions of dollars.
One could argue that many regular employees could do just as well as executives,
yet because they do not have the required Ivy League educations, no corporation
will give them a legitimate opportunity. This argument is exemplified by evidence
that shows executives in Japan and Germany are not separated by the enormous
92

See id. at 115–18; ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 28, at 21.
ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 28, at 21.
94
Id. At that hypothetical level, and assuming a minimum wage earner works forty hours a week,
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be $34, 467.63, both based on the average increase in the Consumer Price Index. Enter calculations at
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pay gap that exists in the United States.96 Others argue that the executives are
worth every penny they are paid, mainly because there are only a select few that
can handle the responsibilities.97 What is seemingly uniform is that rank-and-file
employees feel inferior, both in esteem and in worth. A poll conducted in 2002
concluded that eighty-seven percent of respondents believed that top company
executives are paid more than they deserve, and, significantly, the managers earn
more at the expense of ordinary workers.98 Furthermore, empirical evidence
indicates that when a CEO cuts employees from his company’s workforce, his
compensation increases significantly the next year.99 This indicates that boards
reward those executives that cut the workforce, thereby giving executives the
incentive to make job cuts, even if they are not justified. This also indicates that
management seems to treat ordinary employees as bargaining devices with boards
in that if the executives promise cuts to decrease the outflow of company
resources, they will be compensated accordingly, even if the firm does not perform
better. Ordinary workers will likely begin to feel inferior, thus leading to a
decrease in production.100 Further, this inferiority could lead to a decrease in
worker motivation and disrupt effective teamwork.101 If this occurs, the stability
of the American economy could be in jeopardy.
2. International Comparisons
To broaden the context of the executive compensation problem, it is
important to examine how the United States’ approach compares to that of the rest
of the world. This could influence whether the American market maintains its
dominance in the ever-globalizing world economy. Just as with rank-and-file
employees, executives in America receive significantly higher compensation than
their counterparts in Japan, Britain, and Germany.102 This is hardly surprising.
Though most of this comes from the preferential use of stock options in the United
States,103 it also might have a lot to do with the fact that “shareholder rights in the
U.S. are weaker than they are” elsewhere in the world.104 In particular, the
96
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differences in shareholder rights in the United States and the United Kingdom are
very distinct. First, shareholders in the United Kingdom have the ability to remove
and nominate directors to the board.105 This fact makes it easier for British
shareholders to make directors more accountable. In doing so, the directors take
more initiative to ensure that executives’ compensation is more reasonable,
especially when compared to that in the United States.106 Second, shareholders in
the United Kingdom have the ability to call special meetings and amend corporate
charters through resolutions to address issues that cannot wait until the annual
meetings.107 Not only do the shareholders have more power to remove directors
they believe are not acting in their best interests, new British reforms have made
the normally passive investor a more active player in corporate governance.108
Finally, boards in the United States have the ability to engage in more decisive and
aggressive defensive tactics in response to potential takeovers.109
Given the fact that executives in the United Kingdom earn less money than
executives in the United States, but, “[b]etween 2000 and 2005, the [Financial
Times Stock Exchange] FTSE 100’s average annual return was 6.5% while the
Dow Jones Industrial Average was 2% during the same period,”110 it would seem
that some explanation is required. The approach taken by the United Kingdom
represents the corporate law system in place around the world; only the United
States has so many impediments restricting shareholder power.111
The best counterargument is that most businesses prefer the American
system because it allows the board and management to have more autonomy.
Traditionally, companies favored the regulatory controls imposed by the
government and SEC, which normally gave companies wide latitude and
freedoms,112 provided the companies followed all disclosure rules. This changed
somewhat in the wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley,113 which established requirements
for more oversight and accountability by directors and executives.114 It is true that

house.gov/hearing110/htbebchuk030807.pdf.
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Id.
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See Martin, supra note 5, at 158–59.
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Bebchuk Testimony, supra note 104, at 5.
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Bebchuk Testimony, supra note 104, at 5.
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Martin, supra note 5, at 158-9.
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Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 848
(2005).
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See generally Murphy, supra note 102, at 866–67. Professor Murphy discusses the unique
approach taken in the United States regarding the accounting methods for options, and explains that this
has caused the increasing use of the options because of the tax benefits. Id. at 867. “These tax and
accounting differences can help explain why U.S. boards are more generous with their option grants
than are boards in other countries.” Id.
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at various sections in
Title 15 and 18 U.S.C.).
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See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C §1514A (Supp. IV 2004). An in-depth
discussion on the effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation is well beyond the scope of this paper. What
is important for this section is to note that the increasing regulations are forcing issuers to list in other
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most of the largest businesses in the world are incorporated in the United States,
however a trend has emerged:
[S]ince the new regulatory mechanisms have been put in place, developments in the
U.S. capital market have not been positive. In 2000, 90% of the funds raised by
foreign companies through new stock offerings were raised in the U.S. The “90%
rule” held in 2005, too, but in reverse—90% of the funds raised by foreign firms
through new listings occurred in Europe and other non-U.S. markets. Last year,
only two of the world’s 25 largest initial public offerings listed in the U.S. since
Congress enacted the tighter restrictions.115

If this trend continues, and if American companies continue with the pattern
of grossly excessive pay packages at the same time as restricting shareholder
rights, the United States might indeed lose its place as the dominant financial
power in the world.
III. A NEW ERA OF SHAREHOLDER POWER?
A. The Role of the SEC
After the breakdown of the financial markets in 1929, the American
confidence in the domestic and global financial markets disappeared.116 The
country entered the Great Depression and, thereafter, Congress announced that
they would have hearings to determine possible actions to combat the crises.117
With the information obtained at the hearings, Congress established the SEC to
enforce the new securities laws and promulgate financial regulations in accordance
therewith.118 One of these laws, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (‘34 Act),
provided the SEC with the authority required to establish rules regarding many
aspects of post-IPO trading.119 Section 14 of the ‘34 Act provides the legal

countries. This fact provides support to the argument that companies would not abandon their United
States listings if required to restrict executive pay or provide shareholders more access rights in
governance.
115
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AND THE US’ GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP 17 (2007) (describing that the imposing
obligations of Sarbanes-Oxley are negatively impacting new businesses in the United States); HENRY
N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE: WHAT WE’VE LEARNED; HOW
TO FIX IT (AEI Press 2006).
116
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The information listed states that, “[d]uring the 1920s, approximately 20 million large and small
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market. It is estimated that of the $50 billion in new securities offered during this period, half became
worthless.” Id. It is hard to fathom that type of breakdown in the twenty-first century; only because of
efficient regulation and defensive procedures did our country avoid a complete market crash following
the September 11 attacks.
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provisions that govern the solicitation and requirements of proxies;120 Regulation
14A contains the rules promulgated by the SEC to carry out the purpose of the
securities laws.121 As Congress intended, the broad and expansive duties of
regulating the largest economy in the world fell squarely on the shoulders of the
SEC following the depression. It seems important, then, that the SEC use all of its
abilities within its delegated power to make the American capital markets efficient,
transparent, and fair. As such, the SEC should empower the shareholders of large
public corporations with the ability to engage the governance process in a manner
uncommon in today’s corporate environment.
B. An Overview of the Proxy Process
A proxy allows a shareholder to allow another person to vote on his or her
behalf at the annual meeting of a corporation.122 Due to the nature and
characteristics of proxy material, the law imposes a strict standard of compliance
in an effort to ensure that shareholders exercise their voting rights.123 With that in
mind, the SEC set out the basic form and requirements that a proxy issued by a
company or shareholder must follow in Rule 14a-4.124 In this rule, the proxy shall
indicate who is soliciting the proxy and how this solicitor will act on the proposals
contained in the statement.125 Under the current scheme, if the proxy relates to the
election of directors, it must allow the shareholder an opportunity to either vote for
or withhold a vote for the nominee.126 In addition to establishing minimum

120
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 895 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §
78n (West 2009)).
121
The SEC promulgated various rules, beginning at section 14a-1, to govern proxy solicitations.
17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to a-15 (2007); see also EDWARD BRODSKY & M. PATRICIA ADAMSKI, LAW OF
CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS: RIGHTS, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES, § 15.4 (2007) (providing a
summary of proxy laws established by Congress and rules promulgated by the SEC).
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Rose A. Zukin, We Talk, You Listen: Should Shareholders’ Voices Be Heard or Stifled When
Nominating Directors? How the Proposed Shareholder Director Nomination Rule Will Contribute to
Restoring Proper Corporate Governance, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 937, 955 (2006) (citing Teresa Carnell &
James J. Hanks, Jr., Shareholder Voting and Proxy Solicitation: The Fundamentals, 37 MD. B.J. 23, 24
(2004)).
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See id. at 956.
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See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4.
125
Id. § 240.14a-4(a)(1),(3).
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Id. § 240.14a-4(b)(2). Specifically, this entire section states the following:
A form of proxy which provides for the election of directors shall set forth the
names of persons nominated for election as directors. Such form of proxy shall
clearly provide any of the following means for security holders to withhold
authority to vote for each nominee:
i. A box opposite the name of each nominee which may be marked to
indicate that authority to vote for such nominee is withheld; or
ii. An instruction in bold-face type which indicates that the security holder
may withhold authority to vote for any nominee by lining through or
otherwise striking out the name of any nominee; or
iii. Designated blank spaces in which the security holder may enter the
names of nominees with respect to whom the security holder chooses to
withhold authority to vote; or
iv. Any other similar means, provided that clear instructions are furnished indicating
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requirements for proxy forms, the regulations describe the matters that a proxy
vote cannot confer.127 Specifically, anyone attempting to solicit a proxy must
follow the established guidelines.128 Rule 14a-5 supplements the requirements of
Rule 14a-4, describing how an issuer shall present the proxy information.129
Another important rule is Rule 14a-3, which provides that a proxy statement that
follows the above guidelines must accompany the solicitation of a shareholder’s
proxy.130 These compliance standards enable the SEC to achieve the goal of
maximum disclosure that leads to a better-informed investor.
The proxy system, due to the extensive and specific requirements, provides a
double-edged sword. For any shareholder that wants to make a proposal to enter
on the corporation’s proxy statement, the costs can be insurmountable.131
Incumbent boards always have a significant advantage over shareholders, even the
large block shareholders with vast assets, because shareholders cannot vote against
board-sponsored candidates or propose different board candidates.132 Furthermore,
and very importantly, under Rule 14a-8(i)(8), the “town meeting rule,” directors
may exclude proposals by shareholders that relate to the election of a member to
the board of directors.133 Therefore, not only must a shareholder deal with
extensive barriers to having his or her proposal appear on the company statement,

how the security holder may withhold authority to vote for any nominee.
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information must be in a standard “roman type at least as large and as legible as 10-point modern type.”
Id. § 240.14a-5(d)(1). The proxy must contain information regarding when shareholder proposals are
due and whether the date of the shareholder meeting changes. Id. § 240.14a-5(e)(1), (f).
130
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3.
131
See id. § 240.14a-8. Under the Rules, the SEC says the following concerning shareholder
proposals making the corporate proxy statement:
[I]n order to have your shareholder proposal included on a company's proxy card,
and included along with any supporting statement in its proxy statement, you
must be eligible and follow certain procedures.
....
(1) In order to be eligible to submit a proposal, you must have continuously held
at least $2,000 in market value, or 1%, of the company's securities entitled to be
voted on the proposal at the meeting for at least one year by the date you submit
the proposal. You must continue to hold those securities through the date of the
meeting.
Id. If the shareholder does not meet the eligibility or procedural requirements, the “company
may exclude [the shareholder’s] proposal.” Id.
Id. From attempting to follow that described process, it is obvious that the costs associated with the
requirements make it practically impossible for shareholders to engage in effective corporate
governance.
132
Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L REV. 407, 418
(2006).
133
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8). Shareholders can only submit a proposal if they meet certain
requirements. Normally, corporations are required to include the proposal in its proxy report; however,
if the company can identify that the proposal falls under one of the exceptions delineated in 14a-8, it
may exclude. See id. §§ 240.14a-8(i)(1)–(13). The problems presented by this barrier will be discussed
at length later in the paper. See discussion infra Part III.C.
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the Rules give companies thirteen possible ways to exclude a proposal.134
The SEC does provide limited exceptions for shareholders seeking
information but not a proxy solicitation. However, these exceptions are limited to
shareholder discussion about how he or she will vote and why,135 when a
shareholder attempts communication without requesting a proxy,136 and putting
definitions on what type of material counts as a “solicitation.”137 In other words, if
a shareholder engages in ministerial functions and activities that will have no effect
on meaningful corporate governance, the shareholder will not have to bear the
expense of the proxy process. Though one could argue that those exceptions
extend to roles beyond that, the response to that argument is decisive: These
exceptions do not extend to every shareholder.
In the cases where a controlling shareholder or a corporate activist who
desires to become a controlling shareholder—one who truly wants to affect
governance—attempts to solicit proxies, the Rules are not so lenient. Normally, a
shareholder “testing the waters,” or expressing desires to stay passive, with a
memorandum containing his thoughts will have to file an accompanying proxy
statement.138 Additionally, any shareholder who owns the market value equivalent
of $5,000,000 must file a brief notice with the SEC that can ruin any type of
“stealth approach” for taking over management.139 This has the effect of tipping
off management to potential governance problems, thereby allowing for
preemptive strikes or other actions to avoid proxy fights. With one hand, the SEC
gives shareholders more reasonable means to affect corporate governance, but with
the other hand, the SEC clamps down on those shareholders most capable. The
result is maintaining the status quo.
The SEC does allow shareholders seeking to send out proxies to call upon
the “disclose or mail” rule, which provides that, upon a written request by a
shareholder, a company must disclose the names of its shareholders so that one
soliciting proxies will know where to send the information.140 This will decrease
the upfront costs of a challenging shareholder in getting the information for
potential proxy recipients, but, when compared to the overall barriers, it does
nothing more than further the “feel-good” regulation scheme in place regarding
corporate governance. The regulations established by the SEC are well intended,
and, if used properly, can be very effective, but they can be too cumbersome and
difficult to quantify in lay terms.
If management or a shareholder targets a desired change in board positions,
or if a current board member is stepping down and a proxy statement lists potential
candidates for replacements, the Rules allow for listing and describing candidates
whom shareholders should not pledge their vote.141 Thus, provided a legitimate
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141

See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1)–(13).
Id. § 240.14a-1(l)(2)(iv).
Id. § 240.14a-1(b)(1).
See id. § 240.14a-1(l)(1)(iii).
See id. § 240.14a-3.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(g).
See id. § 240.14a-7.
Id. § 240.14a-4(d)(4).
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candidate makes the ballot without the efforts of shareholders, management retains
the advantage by exercising its ability to “blackball” anyone it deems unworthy.
Taken together, the SEC, through the authority granted to it by Congress,
established a system of proxy solicitation that those interested in fighting for votes
must follow closely, and these laws greatly influence the role of corporate
governance between publicly held corporations and their shareholders.142 If it fails
to follow the rules, a company may face sanctions from the SEC.143
C. Online Availability of Proxy Materials
In a massive step forward in pushing for increased shareholder activism, the
SEC took steps to make proxy materials available online. In doing so, it opened
the door to endless governance possibilities.144 Specifically to address the costs,
time commitments, and difficult standards associated with the traditional proxy,
the SEC took action,145 adopting a “notice and access” model that allows
companies the option to make proxy materials available via the Internet.146
Although this new set of regulations (Internet rules) passed with the specific intent
of lowering the costs and increasing the availability of proxies, it could be used for
an expansive renovation of the current proxy scheme. This new option became
effective on July 1, 2007.147
Perhaps the main downfall of the new regulations is that they are optional,
which is the most significant change from the original proposed rule.148 The final
rules addressed four main categories: (1) content and delivery requirements of
notices; (2) format and posting requirements of notices; (3) safeguards that ensure
shareholders know they have a right to request paper materials; and (4) procedures
non-insider solicitors must follow to use the online proxy solicitation method.149
142
See Carl Landauer, Beyond the Law and Economics Style: Advancing Corporate Law in an Era
of Downsizing and Corporate Reengineering, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1693, 1707 (1996) (reviewing
LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (1995) and MARK J. ROE, STRONG
MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS (1994)).
143
See Zukin, supra note 122, at 955.
144
The new possibilities will be discussed in detail, including how the SEC took back some of the
power it originally granted to shareholders, later in the paper.
145
Specifically, the SEC amended the following Rules:
14a-2, 14a-3, 14a-4, 14a-7, 14a-8, 14a-12, 14a-13, 14b-1, 14b-2, 14c-2, 14c-3,
14c-5, 14c-7, Schedule 14A, Schedule 14C, Form 10-K, Form 10-KSB, Form 10Q, and Form 10-QSB, under the [’34 Act] and Form N-SAR under the [’34 Act]
and the Investment Company Act of 1940. [The SEC also added a] new Rule
14a-16 under the [’34 Act].
Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, 72 Fed. Reg. 4148 (Jan. 29, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-16).
146
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-16 (2007).
147
Memorandum from Mark S. Bergman, Raphael M. Russo & Frances F. Mi, Paul, Weiss,
Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP (Jan. 26, 2007), available at http://www.paulweiss.com/files/
Publication/1b89b45d-9121-4f3d-bc0e-0acbe010353a/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/e013eace3dc8-4790-9881-0b26a7be6e40/NewE-ProxyRules26-Jan-07.pdf.
148
See Shareholder Choice Regarding Proxy Materials, Exchange Act Release No. 34-56135, 17
C.F.R. pt. 240 (July 26, 2007) (stating that its final rule differed slightly from the proposed in that
issuers could decide if they want to take advantage of the Internet Rules).
149
Id.

2009

EXECUTIVE OVERCOMPENSATION

295

1. Content and Delivery
The Internet rules allow a company to provide a shareholder with notice of
availability (Notice) forty or more calendar days before the annual meeting.150 No
other information can appear on this Notice so that shareholders will not confuse
the notice document with the actual proxy card.151 If so, some shareholders might
become confused, returning the notice document in lieu of the proxy card. Just as
the requirements for the statutory prospectus before an IPO, the Notice must offer
information in “plain English.”152 The company must send the Notice via e-mail
or traditional mail, and, ten days after initial delivery, the company can deliver the
proxy card to acquire the shareholder’s vote.153
There were concerns in some comments on the proposed rule that the Notice
would invade shareholder privacy and that the Notice would lead to further
shareholder apathy.154 Some comments indicated that shareholders do not have
email accounts.155 Probably the most important comment received dealt with
“phishing” by dastardly individuals taking advantage of unwitting shareholders.156
While all these issues are very important, if examined under a cost-basis analysis,
the Internet rules provide more benefits than drawbacks.157
2. Posting of Information
There are specific requirements that issuers must meet if they choose to use
the Internet rules. For example, issuers must make materials “publicly accessible,
free of charge, at the Web site address specified in the notice on or before the time
that the notice is sent to the security holder.”158 To comply, an issuer cannot use
the SEC’s EDGAR site and the website must preserve the anonymity of each
shareholder that accesses the materials.159 The information on the web must be
substantially the same as the paper version of the proxy materials.160 The Notice
must have the following: a legend in boldface that describes the content represents
only a notice and that the proxy statement is available online;161 a description of

150

17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-16(a)(1).
Id. § 240.14a-16(e).
152
Id. § 240.14a-16(g).
153
Id. § 240.14a-16(h).
154
Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, supra note 145, at 4148, 4152.
155
Id. at 4152.
156
Id.
157
See generally Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, supra note 145, at 4148, 4162 (providing
a discussion regarding the cost-benefit analysis of going to a system of internet availability of proxies).
158
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-16(b)(1).
159
Id. § 240.14a-16(b)(3) (emphasis added). The prohibition on using EDGAR probably comes
from the desire of the SEC to not subsidize companies by giving them use to a large-scale online
database. The SEC could change its policy and require an EDGAR filing fee that would encourage
more companies to post at a single site to increase the ease on shareholders in finding information.
160
See id.
161
Id. § 240.14a-16(d)(1).
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the date, time, and location of the annual shareholder meeting;162 and information
regarding where a shareholder can request the paper form of the proxy
materials.163 Rule 14a-6, regarding proxy solicitations, still applies, and
companies must comply with all other applicable provisions.164
3. Right to Paper Copies
Another important aspect of the Internet rules is the ability for shareholders
to request paper copies of the proxy materials.165 Shareholders can request the
traditional printed form of the proxy materials if they desire.166 The registrant
must send the information requested within three business days, either by mail or
by e-mail.167 The burden is on the record owner that requests documents to meet
the request for paper proxy materials within a reasonable time.168 The SEC did aid
shareholders by mandating that every notice contain information relating to the
timeline of which a shareholder can request paper materials.169 The cut-off day for
requesting copies is one year after the conclusion of the meeting for which the
proxy materials were applicable.170 Additionally, to further aid privacy interests of
shareholders, the company issuing paper materials via email cannot use the
shareholders e-mail address for any other purpose than proxy delivery.171
It is very important that the SEC regulate the manner in which companies
treat those that opt out of the Internet rules. As indicated from the comments
received by the SEC, many shareholders still find privacy issues with the
Internet.172 Interestingly enough, though, for a shareholder that opts out of the
Internet rules, the company can send the same information by e-mail, which could
be less secure than a website that requires a secure login.
4. Non-Insider Soliciting Parties
In addition to providing registrants with the ability to access e-proxies,
shareholders proposing items to appear in the company proxy report can take
advantage of the new Internet rules. “Under the proposed rules, a person other than
the issuer who undertakes his or her own proxy solicitation . . . would be able to
rely on the . . . ‘notice and access’ model.”173 As the SEC contemplated, this could
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Id. § 240.14a-16(d)(2).
Id. § 240.14a-16(d)(5).
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17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-16(i).
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See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-16(j)(2).
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See id. § 240.14a-16(j)(2).
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Id. § 240.14a-16(j)(1)–(2).
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Id.
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Id.
170
Id. § 240.14a-16(j)(3).
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Id. § 240.14a-16(k)(2).
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Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, 70 Fed. Reg. 74,598, 74,607 (Dec. 15, 2005), available
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-52926fr.pdf.
173
Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, 70 Fed. Reg. 74,598, 74,607 (Dec. 15, 2005), available
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-52926fr.pdf.
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aid shareholders involved in a proxy contest with management by lowering the
costs associated with the process.174 The requirements for soliciting persons rather
than a company are substantially similar to those listed above. One difference is
that the soliciting person may send out a notice by the later of forty days before the
shareholder meeting or ten calendar days after the date the registrant first sent its
proxy statement.175 This allows a solicitor to examine the company’s statement
and then decide if he will initiate an opposing proxy. The Internet rules also
require that soliciting parties send copies of proxy materials only to those whom
they sent a Notice, thereby eliminating the need for wide availability.176
Some practitioners believe that this new ability to solicit e-proxies will
encourage more proxy contests, a conclusion which has factual grounding.177 It
will be interesting to watch whether the SEC makes the Internet rules mandatory in
the future. This decision will largely turn on whether companies take advantage of
the new Internet rules. If the SEC makes the rules mandatory, the climate of
corporate governance will forever change in America. Note that these are the key
provisions of the new Internet rules. Certainly, this progressive move on the part
of the SEC is a new move towards embracing better technology to increase
efficiency and information sharing among investors. It is too early to examine the
effectiveness of the Internet rules, but it seems certain that some shareholders
could see this as an opportunity to play an active role in governance. That is, until
the SEC pulled the rug from under the reform.
D. Maintaining the Norm
After taking the time and expending the effort to provide companies and
shareholders the ability to engage in active governance by developing a practical
approach to proxy solicitation, the SEC, after a long debate, made a decision that
made any new policies to encourage active shareholders moot. Why is it that the
SEC decided not to go further in its seemingly designed effort to shift more power
and control to the shareholders? This section deals with the SEC’s struggle with
shareholder access to a company’s proxy materials for purposes of nominating
directors.
1. Background
The first movement to give shareholders more access to the corporate ballot
came in 1942.178 At that time, the proposal would have given minority
shareholders the ability to include names of potential directors they desired on the
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See id.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-16(l)(2)(i)–(ii).
176
Id. § 240.14a-16(l)(1).
177
SULLIVAN & CROMWELL L.L.P., PROXY SOLICITATION THROUGH THE INTERNET, Dec. 14,
2006, at 3, http://www.adrbny.com/files/SO19088.pdf.
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SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION, DIVISION OF CORPORATE FINANCE, STAFF REPORT:
REVIEW OF THE PROXY PROCESS REGARDING THE NOMINATION AND ELECTION OF DIRECTORS 2 (July
15, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/proxyreport.pdf [hereinafter PROXY REPORT].
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company’s proxy statement.179 The SEC did not adopt the suggested proposals.180
Though it took another thirty-five years, the SEC again took focus on shareholder
access to corporate ballots through the proxy process.181 This time, the
Commission examined shareholder communication, shareholder participation, and
general corporate governance.182 The SEC did adopt regulations that required
companies to produce disclosure regarding whether they had a nominating
committee that would entertain shareholder proposals.183 It did not, however,
adopt or address any other issues to provide for shareholders access.184 The
Commission did acknowledge that if many companies did not adopt nomination
committees, it would have to take action to ensure that shareholders had access to
the proxy process.185
In 1992, the SEC revisited the issue and acknowledged that shareholders
were having little success accessing corporate ballots or even getting their
proposals to nomination committees.186 However, the SEC recognized that
[p]roposals to require the company to include shareholder nominees in the
company’s proxy statement would represent a substantial change in the
Commission’s proxy rules. This would essentially mandate a universal ballot
including both management nominees and independent candidates for board
seats.187

The SEC did permit shareholders to utilize Rule 14a-4(d) to indicate board
candidates they opposed,188 but this reform still does not give shareholders the
true power to make a difference. Note that shareholders do have the ability to
conduct an election contest by following the above-mentioned proxy rules, but,
even after the new Internet Rules, the costs associated with this are very large.189
2. Recent Challenges and Interpretations
In 2003, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal
Employees Pension Plan (AFSCME) requested a no-action letter to determine
whether its proposal for including the representative of a group of shareholders
owning three percent could be excluded from a proxy statement by American
179

Id.
Id. The SEC gave no specific reasons for refusing to adopt the proposal, simply stating, “A
number of the suggestions proposed by the staff were not adopted.” SEC Release No. 34-3347 (Dec.
18, 1942); see also Securities and Exchange Commission Proxy Rules: Hearings on H.R.s 1493, 1821,
2019 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 78th Cong. (1943) (testimony of
SEC Chairman Ganson Purcell).
181
PROXY REPORT, supra note 178, at 3.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
See Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation, in the Corporate Electoral Process
and Corporate Governance Generally, Exchange Act Release No. 34-14970 (July 18, 1978).
185
PROXY REPORT, supra note 178, at 4.
186
Id.
187
Regulation of Communications Among Shareholder, 53 SEC Docket 2028 (Oct. 16, 1992).
188
See PROXY REPORT, supra note 178.
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PROXY REPORT, supra note 178, at 5; see discussion supra Part III.B–C.
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International Group, Inc. (AIG), pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(8).190 In response, the
SEC “issued a no-action letter in which it indicated that it would not recommend
an enforcement action against AIG should the Company exclude the Proposal from
its proxy statement.”191 After AIG excluded the proposal, AFSCME sued to
compel AIG to include its proposal in the company’s proxy report.192 The district
court ruled for AIG, and the case went on appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.193
The issue on appeal was whether the shareholder proposal “relate[d] to an
election” for purposes of Rule 14a-8(i)(8).194 The court pointed to two contrasting
interpretations by the SEC regarding proper exclusions, one from 1976, and one
submitted in an amicus brief to the court.195 The court, based on the conflicting
interpretations, held that a company could exclude proposals that related to an
instant election, but that the language of the regulation said nothing about
excluding proposals for future elections.196 Thus, it determined that AIG
improperly excluded AFSCME’s proposals, but it hedged its holding regarding the
issue of shareholder’s access to the corporate ballot:
[W]e take no side in the policy debate regarding shareholder access to the corporate
ballot. There might be perfectly good reasons for permitting companies to exclude
proposals like AFSCME’s, just as there may well be valid policy reasons for
rendering them non-excludable. However, Congress has determined that such
issues are appropriately the province of the SEC, not the judiciary.197

Though not entirely punting on the difficult issue, the Second Circuit made a
pass on deciding a key issue, thus opening the door to many new interpretations.
3. “Clarification” Provided by the SEC
Realizing that its conflicting interpretations thirty years apart would lead to
further litigation, and because the holding of the Second Circuit conflicted with
decisions of other circuit courts,198 the SEC announced that it was going to begin
taking comment on possible new changes to the ‘34 Act Regulations, specifically
those regarding shareholders’ ability to nominate directors.199 Its decision to do so
must have come in light of the Second Circuit thumbing its nose at the SEC,
especially regarding prior interpretations of a very controversial issue.
Specifically, the SEC stated that its “position that the election exclusion should not
190
American International Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 235,
2005 WL 372266 (Feb 14, 2005).
191
AFSCME v. AIG, Inc., 462 F.3d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 2006).
192
AFSCME v. AIG, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 2d 344, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
193
Id. at 348.
194
AFSCME, 462 F.3d at 125.
195
Id. at 126.
196
Id. at 127–28.
197
Id. at 130–31.
198
Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, 92 SEC Docket 256, at 9 (Jan. 10,
2008).
199
PROXY REPORT, supra note 178, at 1.
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be, and was not originally intended to be, limited” by the Second Circuit’s
preference on the 1976 interpretation.200 Further, the Commission cited a recent
United States Supreme Court case where the interpretation of agency rules by the
Second Circuit was in question.201 In that case, the Court determined that an
agency’s interpretation of its own rules is controlling unless the interpretation is
clearly erroneous, notwithstanding possible different interpretations over the
course of many years.202 Armed with a favorable Supreme Court ruling and
determined to decrease the amount of uncertainty surrounding the shareholder
access interpretation, the SEC began analyzing the fate of Rule 14a-8(i)(8).
SEC Chairman Christopher Cox had one time stated that he wanted to
expand the influence of shareholders in proxy contests,203 yet when the vote came
before the Commission in July of 2007, he voted both for and against the new
proposal.204 The initial proposal by Democrats called for a five percent threshold
requirement that shareholders would have to meet to reach the ballot; the initial
proposal by Republicans called for a continued bar for shareholders seeking to
access corporate ballots.205 Subsequently, on January 10, 2008, the SEC made its
decision, confirming its 1990 interpretation, and further modifying Rule 14a8(i)(8) to exclude any proposal that “would set up a process for shareholders to
conduct an election contest in the future by requiring the company to include
shareholders’ director nominees in the company’s proxy materials for subsequent
meetings.”206 Not only did the SEC prevent shareholders from setting up future
contested elections, but it also went through with action that opposed the original
intent as stated by Chairman Cox, and the SEC continued its blockade against
shareholders seeking to engage in nominating directors to a company’s board.207
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Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, supra note 198, at 10.
Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158 (2007).
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Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, supra note 198, at 13.
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Specifically, the SEC stated, “We believe that the clarifying rule amendment is consistent with
the agency’s longstanding interpretation of the election exclusion and that the references to
‘nomination’ and ‘procedure’ in the rule text appropriately reflect the purpose of the exclusion.” Id. at
18. That might be well and true, but the overarching issue the SEC seemed to avoid was, if it changed
its approach regarding the nomination exclusion, it would have had to address many other issues
relating to contested election disclosures and new interpretations of several other proxy provisions. See
id. at 3–6. This paper does not suggest the SEC was lazy, but it does look very suspicious, given its
recent move towards empowering shareholders by making proxy materials more readily available.
Even in its description of the Election Exclusion in the Proposed Rule that the SEC put out for
comment, it reiterated the disclosure issue: “The proper functioning of the election exclusion is critical
to prevent the circumvention of other proxy rules that are carefully crafted to ensure that investors
receive adequate disclosure in election contests.” Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of
Directors, 91 SEC Docket 575 (July 27, 2007) (emphasis added). It continued by stating that, if
shareholders wanted to replace directors, they would need to go through the proxy process. Id. This
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E. Future Implications
In explaining the proxy system, detailing its new reform, and providing
information that leads one to conclude the SEC recognizes the problem of
executive overcompensation, it is apparent that the SEC has established the
groundwork for increasing shareholder information and participation. The SEC
recognized the potential of the Internet, implemented appropriate regulations that
would help companies and shareholders open lines of communication, and
displayed it was working to attain the goals listed in its mission statement.208
These changes should signal the beginning of a new era of corporate governance;
however, the SEC has reinforced its blockade to limit shareholders’ ability to reach
the ballot.209 Thus, the SEC has stalled in taking advantage of the invaluable asset
the Internet provides. Why else would the SEC work as it did when it expects
shareholders not to respond? In the era of Enron and WorldCom, it is evident that
much is required to avert further economic disasters due to weak corporate boards
and managers. Greater proxy availability will address the collective action
problems.210 As Professor Bernard Black explains, “Shareholder passivity may be
partly a function of the legal rules” that impose great restrictions on investors who
want to become active in corporate governance.211 In the changing proxy
environment, it seems very possible that many shareholders will be inclined to read
the materials available in a form that allows for paperless examination and become
an active participator in the decision-making process. For example, a shareholder
that normally takes a passive approach, i.e., checking every box management
suggested, upon receiving a proxy request, if he received this solicitation online,
might take an extra five minutes of his day to investigate some issues presented.
The Internet provides access to much information, both reliable and
questionable in nature. If a shareholder has a proposal for changing a policy or
norm on the company’s proxy statement, an investor that usually acquiesces might
engage in a Google search to research any issues presented, thus producing a
better-informed and reasoned vote. The Internet rules will not provide the
definitive result to make every passive investor engage in informative governance
and it will not overcome, by itself, the collective action problem, but it should
encourage a new movement and approach towards more meaningful and beneficial
corporate governance. Mainly, the increased access and lower costs will help
those shareholders that have holdings beyond that of what the everyday passive
investor would have, such as pension funds, insurance companies, and other
institutional investors. This in turn could change the environment that currently
exists where the voting rights that shareholders hold—emphasized in the
theoretical educational setting and corporate finance courses as the benefit that
overcomes the disadvantage of only having a residual claim to corporate assets—
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have largely become ceremonial.212
IV. INEFFECTIVE APPROACHES TO CONTROLLING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
Because the SEC continues to take its line against allowing shareholders the
ability to access the corporate ballot, there must be some other way to control the
executive overcompensation problem. This section of the paper provides analysis
of the various ways and means executive compensation could be controlled, but
has not due to a myriad of reasons. Specifically, the next sections analyze the
ineffectiveness of the new SEC disclosure rules and the enormous loopholes and
exceptions installed in the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) by Congress that have
both failed in their attempt to control executive compensation. Although possible
solutions to aid the shortcomings will be provided, the main problem seems to be
the dedication of the SEC and Congress to address the issue.
A. SEC Disclosure Rules
One constant trait of the SEC is its consistent use of rulings to address issues
that come about in the market. One issue the SEC routinely addresses is how
executive compensation disclosure should appear on ‘34 Act companies proxy
materials. Though the executive compensation issue was not as pervasive through
the early part of the twentieth century, it has become increasingly important as the
pay packages increase to gargantuan proportions. Beginning in 1938, the SEC has
regularly issued releases and final rulings regarding compensation disclosures,
sometimes aiming to increase narrative disclosure, sometimes aiming for tabular or
graphical disclosures, and sometimes both.213 The idea each time is to encourage
companies to list information in plain English that would be easily understandable,
but not overly uniform as to appear like boilerplate language.214
Thus, in 1992, the SEC adopted another new set of rules under Regulation SK “[t]o improve shareholders’ understanding of all forms of compensation paid to
senior executives and directors, the criteria used by the board of directors in
reaching compensation decisions, and the degree of relationship between
compensation and corporate performance.”215 Specifically, the regulations provide
212
See Seth W. Ashby, Note, Strengthening the Public Company Board of Directors: Limited
Shareholder Access to the Corporate Ballot vs. Required Majority Board Independence, 2005 U. ILL. L.
REV. 521, 528 (2005).
213
See, e.g., Disclosure of Executive Compensation, SEC Release No. 33-6486, 48 Fed. Reg.
44,467 (Sept. 23, 1983) (calling for the use of tables to describe compensation not based in equity);
Amended Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 34-4775, 17 Fed. Reg. 11,430, 11,431 (Dec. 11,
1952) (requiring tables for pension and deferred compensation); Amended Proxy Rules, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-3347, 7 Fed. Reg. 10,653 (Dec. 18, 1942) (requiring tables in the disclosure forms);
Amended Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 34-1823, 3 Fed. Reg. 1991, 1992 (Aug. 13, 1938)
(providing the first rules regarding disclosure of how boards determine executive compensation).
214
For purposes of this paper, the last three releases will be discussed.
215
Executive Compensation Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,126 (1992) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 228,
229, 240, 249). Regulation S-K disclosures include items that a ’34 Act company must disclose to the
SEC but do not fall within the traditional definition of financial information. See Regulation S-K,
MoneyGlossary.com, http:// www.moneyglossary.com/?w=Regulation+S-K (last visited Mar. 29,
2008).

2009

EXECUTIVE OVERCOMPENSATION

303

that companies must list the compensation paid to the top executives in a Summary
Compensation Table to allow shareholders the ability to examine easily any
proposed pay packages.216 A board’s compensation committee must also include,
per the regulations, reports on how well the executives met the company’s
performance standards.217 Finally, the compensation committee must list the
cumulative total return to shareholders in the form of a line graph and another
graph to allow shareholders to examine the return of the S&P 500 or return of any
peer companies in the registrant’s industry. 218
In 2003, the SEC again adopted rules in an attempt to “increase shareholder
awareness of and involvement in the executive compensation decision-making
process.”219 Additionally, the Self-Regulatory Organizations (“SROs”)—NYSE
and NASDAQ—procured new standards to expand shareholder approval
requirements for executive compensation.220 These new changes came in the wake
of the Enron disaster and related specifically to the full disclosure of all equity
payments to executives.221 In 2006, the SEC again proposed new rules to “provide
investors with a clearer and more complete picture of compensation to principal
executive officers, principal financial officers, the other highest paid executive
officers and directors.”222 These disclosure rules seek to provide information on
deferred compensation for the three recent fiscal years.223 Importantly, these new
rules require disclosure of personal benefits executives receive in excess of
$10,000, but “[a]n item is not a perquisite or personal benefit if it is integrally and
directly related to the performance of the executive’s duties.”224 There is also a
requirement that companies disclose executives’ total compensation.225 The
purpose of this requirement “is to eliminate the ‘holy-cow moment’ when
shareholders learn the CEO is about to collect” massive amounts of deferred
compensation.226 Requiring disclosure of total compensation might be the most
successful requirement to date because it will give shareholders a quantifiable and

216

Executive Compensation Doctrine, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,127 (1992).
Id.
218
Id.
219
McClendon, supra note 30, at 976.
220
Id. A discussion on the role of SROs is well-beyond the scope of this paper. It is of note, that
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to an industry that tends to freak people out when times are bumpy and their savings seems to be wilting
away. The SEC and SROs piggyback on each other when it comes to implementing new regulations
and disclosure rules, sometimes one looking to the other to implement major controversial changes.
What is certain is that SROs are necessary to the market, and their effectiveness could expand if the
SEC fails to put more power in the shareholders’ hands.
221
Disclosure of Equity Compensation Plan Information, SEC Release No. 8,048, 17 C.F. R. §
228-29, 240, 249 (Feb. 1, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8048.htm; see also
Janet Whitman, Stock Options Face Scrutiny in Wake of Enron, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 2002, at B7B.
222
Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8655, 71
Fed. Reg. 6,542, 6,543, 17 C.F.R. §§ 22-29, 239-40, 245, 249, 274) (Feb. 8, 2006).
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Id. at 6,543.
224
Id. at 6,553.
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Martin, supra note 5, at 152 (quoting Gretchen Morgenson, A ‘Holy Cow’ Moment in Payland,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2006, § 3, at 1).
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comparable number as opposed to a figure discounted to its present value or
adjusted for “other” accounting purposes. Still, some figures might lose context
within all of the information provided.
In short, the SEC has sought to make executive pay package disclosure
simple to read, analyze, and understand—which happens to be the same purpose of
the SEC for the past seventy years.227 Sometimes the simplest representations do
not convey the overarching problems they seek to address. The tables and graphs
include objects such as options and grants, which to the normal shareholder has
little meaning.228 The trouble with the disclosure rules is that companies have
simply just taken their other filings, including the 10-K and 10-Q, and just relisted
some information and rearranged other materials.229 This boilerplate language
complies with the law, but does little to expose the outrageous behavior of some
companies regarding executive pay packages. Although the SEC has consistently
tried to address the use of boilerplate language, it consistently fails to pass
regulations that press companies to use specialized and specific drafting.
Additionally, with the many regulations, the SEC still takes the position that it
seeks to improve only disclosure and not institute wage controls.230 Therefore, to
the SEC, transparency is the key to effective governance and to controlling
executive compensation. The many rules and interpretations are well intended but,
given the number and frequency, they seem ineffective.
Before discussing whether the SEC could control executive compensation
through transparency, and given Chairman Cox’s statements that the market should
always control, does the SEC have any intention in even trying to help control the
problem? Further, does the SEC think there is a problem? It is logical to conclude
that the SEC recognizes a problem because of the many regulations,
interpretations, and proposals it has issued over the past seventy years. Provided
that background, there are steps the SEC could take to produce better results.
The SEC could call for disclosure of useful information in a manner that one
can analyze independent from any other items, such as the pay ratios of the
executives compared to other employees.231 By only requiring disclosure of the
executives’ compensation, sometimes in a percentage form, the current rules allow
for a company to skew the real figures. The disclosures do not require companies
to state performance targets; thus, shareholders have no clue whether the
executives are meeting the outlined objectives232 that the shareholders approved.233
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Id. at 150.
See id. at 150.
229
See Scott P. Spector, The Compensation Committee Report, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO SEC
PROXY AND COMPENSATION RULE 4.2 (2d ed. Supp. 2000).
230
Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, SEC Chairman’s Opening Statement: Proposed Revisions to
the Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure Rules (Jan. 17, 2006) (transcript available
at. http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch011706cc.htm). SEC Chairman Cox is the poster-boy
marketer: the “market is capable of disciplining excessive compensation, provided that the market has
adequate information.” Kara Scannell, SEC to Propose Overhaul of Rules on Executive Pay, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 10, 2006, at A2.
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Stabile, supra note 62, at 162.
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For a company to deduct payments to executives beyond $1 million, they must submit
performance standards for approval to the shareholders. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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The SEC should require detailed disclosure of these targets and any other goals. It
seems that there is a lack of dedication with the SEC’s rules that makes them
resemble only “feel-good” rulemaking. There is little indication that making
compensation packages widely known would make transparency even work.234
With the SEC’s lack of initiative to require full and material disclosures combined
with its recent decision to allow companies to continue barring shareholder board
nominations, the SEC has proven it to be ineffective, assuming it wants to make
the effort, in controlling executive overcompensation.
B. Recent Congressional and Presidential Efforts
Congress has recently decided to play its hand in the effort to control
executive compensation. Both the House and Senate introduced legislation in
April 2007 to amend Section 14 of the ‘34 Act. The House version, sponsored by
Representative Barney Frank, provided for a separate shareholder vote to approve
executive compensation packages. However, the effect of this provision was
greatly hedged by the remaining portion of the proposed legislation. The
shareholders’ votes would be advisory. Specifically,
The shareholder vote shall not be binding on the corporation or the board of
directors; nor be construed (1) as overruling a board decision; (2) to create or imply
additional fiduciary duty by such board; (3) to restrict or limit shareholder ability to
make proposals for inclusion in proxy materials related to executive
compensation.235

The legislation also included a provision requiring shareholder approval of
golden parachutes, but again, any votes by the shareholders would be advisory.
The Senate version, which consisted of the exact same provisions of the bill
introduced in the House, was introduced by-then Illinois Junior Senator Barack
Obama.236 The Senate version was never sent to Committee, and the House
version was never voted on by the Senate after it passed the House.237 After the
congressional session ended, the bills were cleared from the books.238 They were
not reintroduced.239 Instead, now-President Obama proposed and the Treasury
Department issued regulations limiting executives pay at financial institutions that
accepted government assistance through TARP.240 The regulations provide a limit
233
Martin, supra note 5, at 162; see Joann S. Lublin, Boards Tie CEO Pay More Tightly to
Performance—Options Grants May Depend on Meeting Financial Goals; Moving Beyond a “Pulse”,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 2006, at A1.
234
Temple University, News Communications, Accounting Professor: Transparency Won’t
Necessarily Control CEO Pay, available at http://www.temple.edu/newsroom/2007_2008/10/stories/
execcomp.htm.
235
H.R. Res. 1257, 110th Congress (2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_reports&docid=f:hr088.110.pdf.
236
S. Res 1181, 110th Congress, (2007), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:
SN01181:@@@L&summ2=m&.
237
Govtrack.us, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-1257.
238
Id.
239
Id.
240
Office of the Press Secretary, Treasury Announces New Restrictions On Executive
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of $500,000 in total compensation for senior executives, plus restricted stock, and
require the companies to meet strict disclosure requirements.241 These restrictions
and requirements only apply to companies that received and will receive assistance
from the government.242 Thus, it will not have any affect on most American
corporations. Though it will take time to determine if this type of restriction will
be extended to other industries, it appears that Congress may again someday
introduce legislation to allow shareholders access to the corporate ballot.
However, with the economy in a deep recession, congressional attention to other
issues is taking priority over any potential legislation regarding executive pay. It
appears that until the economy recovers, there will be little attention by Congress
to shareholder rights. Even if Congress does act, if it implements laws that have
language similar to that quoted above from HR 1257, it may not be enough.
Furthermore, although the President has taken a hard line with respect to
compensation limits for executives at companies receiving government assistance,
it is difficult to determine if the executive branch can maintain the ability to
monitor and limit executives’ pay at publicly traded corporations.
C. Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m)
The IRC allows for the deduction of all “ordinary and necessary expenses
paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business,
including . . . a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for
purposes actually rendered.”243 For corporations with enormous cash resources
and payrolls of accountants, this business deduction would appear to provide an
unfair competitive advantage. However, Congress played its hand in an effort to
control executive compensation. Though the success of the effort is highly
questionable, as is using the IRC for social and political policy, it shows that
Congress recognized a problem exists. At the suggestion of the House Committee
on Ways and Means, it passed as part of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993,
subsection (m) to section 162 (162(m)), which was added to the IRC in an effort to
limit corporate tax deductions allowed as part of executive compensation.244 This
provision came about to address the perceived crisis that American industries were
becoming less competitive internationally, yet executive pay was soaring to new
record highs.245 The provision appears straightforward, but it has caused much
critique because of its ineffective ability to influence executive compensation.246
Compensation,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/TreasuryAnnouncesNewRestrictionsOn
ExecutiveCompensation/.
241
Id. See also U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Announces TARP Capital Purchase
Program Description, http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1207.htm.
242
Id.
243
I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (2009).
244
Steven Balsam & David Ryan, Limiting Executive Compensation: The Case of CEOs Hired
After the Imposition of 162(m), J. OF ACCT. AUDITING & FIN. (Fall 2007), manuscript available at
http://astro.temple.edu/~ryan/162m.pdf.
245
Id.
246
See, e.g., Hearing Before the S. Fin. Comm. on the Effectiveness of § 162(m), at 1 (Sept. 6,
2006) (Testimony of Steven Balsam, Professor of Accounting, Temple University Fox School of
Business), available at http://www.senate.gov/~finance/hearings/testimony/2005test/090606testsb.pdf
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1. The Provision
In relevant part, section 162(m) provides that no publicly held corporation
may deduct any amount over $1 million paid to employees whom are included
within the statutory definition of “covered employee.”247 Included in this
definition are the CEO and the four highest paid executives.248 For purposes of
section 162(m), a “publicly held corporation” is one registered pursuant to the ‘34
Act.249 Not included in the statutory cap are non-taxable fringes,250 qualified
retirement plans, and shareholder-approved performance-based compensation.251
Unfortunately, the exceptions swallow the rule. No compensation made in the
form of commissions or upon meeting the performance goals count toward the
statutory limit.252 The language of the section shows Congress’ desire to place
emphasis on publicly held corporations gearing executives’ pay to center around
their performance.253 To deduct under the performance goals exception, the
company must follow statutory guidance. First, a compensation committee
composed of at least two independent directors must determine the material terms
for which the company will compensate the executive.254 Next, the company must
disclose the terms of the pay and obtain approval by a majority of shareholders.255
Finally, the compensation committee must certify that the performance goals were
satisfied.256
2. The Ineffectiveness of 162(m)
The exceptions provided in the IRC account for why Congress, through the
IRC, has been ineffective in regulating or restraining the excessive executive
compensation. First, companies have shifted to either all commission-based pay,
or have established easily attainable performance goals to ensure any payments in
excess of the statutory cap may still be deducted.257 If Congress really intended to

(“section 162(m) has been at best, only marginally effective in limiting executive pay or in making it
more responsive to performance”) [hereinafter Balsam Testimony]; Polsky, supra note 47, at 920
(“empirical evidence confirms the intuition that 162(m) is not helpful to shareholders”); McClendon,
supra note 30, at 1017 (calling for a repeal of section 162(m) because of its emphasis on performancebased compensation packages); Susan J. Stabile, Is There a Role for Tax Law in Policing Executive
Compensation?, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 81, 101 (1998) (arguing that the I.R.C. has no role in regulating
compensation).
247
I.R.C. § 162(m)(1) (2008).
248
Id. § 162(m)(3)(A)–(B). In determining whether an individual is the chief executive officer or
one of the four highest paid officers, the Tax Regulations cross-reference the disclosure rules
promulgated by the SEC and discussed earlier in the paper. Treas. Reg. § 1.162(c)(2)(ii); see discussion
supra Part IV.A.
249
Id. § 162(m)(2).
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See id. § 132(a).
251
Balsam & Ryan, supra note 244.
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I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(B)–(C).
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See Martin, supra note 5, at 160.
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I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C)(i)–(ii).
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Id. § 162(m)(4)(C)(ii).
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Id. § 162(m)(4)(C)(iii).
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See Balsam & Ryan, supra note 244, at 3; see also Stabile, supra note 246, at 88–89.
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limit compensation, it should have taken a hard-line approach and removed the
many exceptions. Even the argument that safeguards exist so that independent
directors examine the packages and shareholders approve the performance goals
holds little weight. As noted, shareholders play a ministerial role in examining
proposals, and boards, including independent directors, exercise hardly any true
negotiating power. Thus, section 162(m) is wholly ineffective.
Even if the shareholders do not approve any performance packages, or if the
independent directors reject a payment package that is performance-based, some
companies have simply ignored the statutory limitation and paid in excess of the
statutory cap.258 This raises the issue of a “why bother” attitude in implementing a
provision like section 162(m) if it will hardly be acknowledged. The indifference
exercised by some companies is mindboggling. Furthermore, data supports some
critics’ argument that Congress’ efforts actually caused an increase in executive
pay because of the wide latitude it gave to performance-based compensation.259
Not only does data show that compensation package amounts are increasing,
companies have engaged in “grossing up” payments to executives to cover any
other potential taxes for which they would be liable. The effects are astounding.
In “an irony unknown to most . . . CEOs, who may be making hundreds of times
what the average worker receives, may pay nothing in taxes because shareholders
pay the taxes for them.”260
Even within the Treasury Regulations, which the United States Treasury
Department promulgated to clarify provisions in the IRC, there is additional
language that seems to cut against the intended purpose of section 162(m), and
against the overall purpose and goals of the tax system. Specifically, “in the case
of excessive payments by corporations, if such payments correspond or bear a
close relationship to stockholdings, and are found to be a distribution of earning or
profits, the excessive payments will be treated as a dividend.”261 This is troubling
because, instead of discouraging excessive payments, companies have incentives,
if they will not fit under any exception in section 162(m) and are indifferent to the
consequences, to pay in masked dividends under the Treasury Regulations. By
doing so, instead of the executive paying tax at the highest tax bracket,262 the
companies can assure their executives pay tax on the largest portion of their
income at the dividend level.263 Thus, not only are companies able to manipulate
the IRC, they can provide additional benefits to their executives by lowering their
tax bill. The result has cost the federal government billions in tax revenue over the
past fourteen years.264
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The Internal Revenue Service has established a compliance program to root
out the many incidents of corporations establishing simple performance goals,
disregarding the statutory cap, or grossing up pay to executives.265 Corporations
are exercising too much leverage over Congress, shareholders, and the economy.
Further revision is required if Congress really desires to put some dent into the
increasing overcompensation problem. Specifically, the IRC must not give such
leeway to options and other performance-based compensation. It could require
that options price at market-adjusted levels and then reclassify as ordinary
remuneration.266 The performance goals exception could require stringent
disclosure and increased performance-based requirements that use completely
objective criteria. Additionally, corporations should be required to detail any tax
benefits given up or penalties incurred by choosing to ignore section 162(m). With
the current situation, any of these suggestions seem highly unlikely, but if any
changes occur, what is the probability that any court or the IRS would be willing to
intervene? Building upon the deferential attitude and business judgment rule,
courts, even specialized administrative courts like the tax court, hesitate to
intervene in market-driven decisions.267 As written, section 162(m) overlooks—
perhaps by choice—the true problems associated with performance-based
compensation. It has not led to a reduction in CEO compensation,268 and if no
modification is reasonable, Congress must reevaluate using the IRC for this
purpose.
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See Balsam Testimony, supra note 246, at 3.
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See In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 192 (2007) (stating that the
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3. Policy Concerns
A broader argument can be made that Congress should not use the IRC to
attempt to control executive compensation. Using the IRC for reasons not
associated with tax policy seems questionable.269 “It is clear that [section] 162(m)
is not grounded in tax policy considerations; . . . executive compensation ought to
be deductible in full . . . . Rather, the provision is simply a penalty that is
administered through the [IRC].”270 Not only does section 162(m) have no basis in
tax policy, it has been wholly ineffective.271 If Congress starts extending the
purposes of the IRC beyond that of tax considerations, this could lead to confusion
and outcry by the American people. Americans are adverse to paying taxes, recall
the American Revolution, and if Congress makes a habit of using the IRC to
regulate additional private-party compensation, healthcare, or education—all
reasonable in the face of section 162(m)—the American market could suffer
irreparable harm due to massive protest. Maybe the SEC should have the lead in
this purpose. Still, some argue that any type of compensation decisions should be
entirely up to market determination, thus keeping Congress out of the equation.272
As previously discussed, this approach has failed to control the problem.273
Although well intended, 162(m) proves to be ineffective because of wide
exceptions, corporate indifference, and potential improper politically based uses
for the IRC.
V.

INCREASING THE SHAREHOLDERS’ ROLE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

First, this paper provided analysis and discussion for why passivity on
corporate boards has led to overconfident and powerful executives that dictate
compensation terms to directors.274 Then the paper outlined the role the SEC plays
in corporate governance, particularly in the proxy area.275 Next, it described how
the SEC refused to make the next logical step in the new era of governance by
continuing to allow boards to ignore shareholder proposals regarding nominating

269
See e.g., Polsky, supra note 47, at 884; McClendon, supra note 30, at 1017 (noting that other
regulatory schemes exist for better controlling executive compensation packages); Yablon, supra note
2, at 281, 293–95 (indicating the negative influence §162(m) has had on executive pay); cf. Stabile,
supra note 246, at 95 (“Congress consistently uses the tax laws to accomplish objectives that are not tax
related.”).
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This contradicts her earlier argument that Congress should regulate executive compensation as a matter
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directors.276 Then, the paper discussed how the SEC, through requiring increased
disclosure, and Congress, though its efforts in the IRC, failed to control executive
overcompensation.277 Those sections cumulatively laid the foundation for an
argument that the internet, a re-interpretation of one SEC Rule, and shareholders,
working together, hold the key to limiting executive compensation. Shareholders
must be motivated and be given the ability and opportunity to monitor and control
passive corporate boards that rubber-stamp poor management decisions. If the
SEC were to allow shareholders the ability to reach the ballot, the nomination
process would resemble a type of campaign, where potential directors would
explain to voting shareholders how they intend to increase firm efficiency.
A. The Meaning of Corporate Governance
Governance in the corporate context developed in the 1980s to describe the
struggle between shareholders and directors to establish the “structure,
relationships, norms, control mechanisms, and objectives of the corporate
enterprise.”278 An idea by some concludes that companies perform with the
shareholders remaining at all times on the sideline, deferring to management and
the board with unquestioned trust.279 This position holds that, provided
shareholders have the power to make changes, they will drain the corporation of
capital by constant demands.280 In response, how can anyone argue that the
exorbitant pay packages given to executives do not do the same thing? At least the
efforts of shareholder activists would target removing one draining source in hopes
of replacing it with something more sustainable and accountable. However, before
increasing the activity of the average shareholder to address this issue, a glaring
problem exists: the collective action problem. For any possible way to increase
activism, there is a need to either increase the power shareholders have with their
limited voting rights, or make any efforts by shareholders to participate have little
cost.
The true meaning of corporate governance is lost on corporations and foreign
to shareholders. The “traditional” approach to governance in the State of Delaware
is one that provides managers with great authority to pursue different business
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opportunities and little restraint.281 Shareholders have a limited role, including the
ability to vote on fundamental transactions—namely mergers; elect directors
annually—normally by proxy; obtain access to company records—as required by
the SEC; and sue directors for not upholding fiduciary duties—severely limited by
state exculpatory clauses.282 The traditional approach is one that favors executive
autonomy. This has its basis in wanting directors and managers to make riskier
decisions and not fear intervention from possible annoying shareholders concerned
about potential losses.283 In fact, Vice Chancellor Leo J. Strine, Jr. of the
Delaware Court of Chancery284 stated, “The primary goal of corporate law . . . is
not to prevent failure at each and every firm to the fullest extent possible, but to
facilitate maximum creation of durable societal wealth by all firms.”285 Though
that has a positive ring, the truth is that the traditionalists have completely quieted
the shareholders. To have true corporate governance, as contemplated by the
meaning of the term, the shareholders must have more influence.
B. Overcoming the Collective Action Problem
The most logical argument against allowing shareholders more power is that,
even given the opportunity, the collective action problem would not lead to results.
The collective action problem occurs when dispersed shareholders, who lack the
power to make significant changes individually, remain passive in their decisions,
even though they might oppose a proffered position. It is easy to understand why
this would be such a problem in the context of publicly traded companies in the
United States. The idea of a publicly traded company having a majority
shareholder is almost unconceivable in today’s standards. Still, for any changes to
occur regarding executive pay packages, the shareholders that own larger blocks of
shares must have the opportunity to affect change they desire. As the system
stands, they have no power and must put complete reliance on the board of
directors, who normally have interests aligned with executives.
To overcome the collective action problem, the SEC, as part of needed
overhaul, could, in the ‘34 Act Regulations, offer shareholders economic
incentives for engaging in governance. It could offer reimbursement for costs
associated with replacing boards when private shareholders go through the proxy
process.286 This could aid in preventing the free-rider problem from negatively
affecting those shareholders that are willing to be active. As already established,
the proxy rules changed significantly in the past two years, and Internet rules will
greatly decrease the costs associated with proxy contests.
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This new system would most benefit the large-owner shareholders, such as
pension funds and insurance companies. For example, the state pension fund in
California, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS),
would likely take advantage of new rules that allowed it more access to corporate
ballots. CalPERS uses its financial clout—$131 billion in over 1800 American
companies—to engage in corporate governance by simply posting a list of
companies whose policies it disagrees with, most recently targeting the Xerox
Company and others.287 It is reasonable to assume that if the SEC opened the
door, CalPERS would increase its governance activities. This example is one of
many that would likely occur.
This paper does not suggest that the average shareholder—Ordinary Joe—
who invests with a life-long friend that is his broker will care enough to engage in
challenging an incumbent board of directors. That position would be unreasonable
and unrealistic. However, the large-block owners—insurance firms, brokerage
firms, mutual funds—do have an incentive to become more active, especially if the
SEC allows them to do so. The aim is not to increase the governance activities of
Ordinary Joe, but to increase the activity of those who deal with the money of ten
thousand Ordinary Joes. The large-block owners would have various incentives,
one of them including advertising and goodwill possibilities where they describe
their activism in the market. Through their advertising, the Ordinary Joes might be
more willing to invest with a large-block shareholder than with a passive largeblock owner. Furthermore, these large-block investors are likely to engage in the
type of behavior required to change a corporation only after it observes long-term
deficiencies in its business structure.288 Even that type of power, if provided,
would alter the way most companies engage in business. It seems simple, but also
effective.
A main proponent for keeping the status quo, especially regarding measures
to address the collective action problem, is Professor Stephen Bainbridge.289 He
observes:
If investors valued the rights [to increasing power in corporate governance], we
would expect to observe entrepreneurs who are taking a company public to offer
such rights either through appropriate provisions in the firm’s organic documents or
by lobbying state legislatures to provide such rights off the rack in the corporation
code.290

This argument fails to recognize, first, that an entrepreneur might not have the
same interests as a large-block shareholder that aims to affect corporate policy.
Primarily, this type of investor would desire to retain control over the corporation,
unwilling to cede any control to the shareholders, in an effort to retain as much
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control over the business plan as possible. This might not be such a bad thing, at
the beginning, because drastic intervention from shareholders could lead to
confused goals or irreconcilable changes in practice. It is only after a company
establishes itself, produces, and then becomes too comfortable with those that got
it there, will any outside influence be important.
Second, as already shown, if Congress cannot and will not address the issue,
why would state legislatures be able to do any better? Delaware would never
dream of such a position, given that the majority of its state income comes from
the revenues it receives on corporate charters.291 In the ever-increasing
incorporation competition among states, aptly named the race-to-the-bottom, a
move to increase shareholder power in Delaware would assure that a state like
Nevada would become the new hotbed for incorporation.292 The fact is that the
directors and managers of publicly traded companies do not want their
shareholders to have more power. This is exactly why the SEC should review its
analysis and decision to allow companies to continue to exclude shareholder
proposals, namely when they relate to the election of directors. No state that seeks
the revenue from franchise taxes and corporate charters would be willing to put
themselves on the “cutting edge” of shareholder rights reform, mainly because of
the competitive nature of the business. This is why federal intervention to level the
field among all players is required. Regardless of the form, the substance is that
the shareholders, once comfortably passive, seem ready to take a more active role
in the businesses they own.
C. Nominating Directors to the Board
The board, and only the board, has the power to hire and negotiate pay
packages with the CEO.293 Therefore, the SEC should reexamine its position and
interpretation of Rule 14a-8(i)(8) and implement a workable system that addresses
the growing movement to increasing shareholder activism. The current position—
”Under a few specific circumstances, the company is permitted to exclude
[shareholders’] proposal, . . . [i]f the proposal relates to an election for membership
on the company’s board of directors or analogous governing body”294—is directly
adverse to the idea of effective corporate governance. At the beginning of
research, the SEC sat mulling over challenges to its interpretation to Rule 14a8(i)(8). Since that time, the SEC has delivered a devastating blow, citing
disclosure concerns as the cornerstone of the opposition,295 to possibly active
shareholders, like the AFSCME, that desired to make changes in the structure of a
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publicly traded company.296
As the current governance system stands, shareholders have no other
(legitimate) way to influence or replace directors. For instance, the business
judgment rule insulates directors from liability.297 Shareholders may also let their
feet do the talking and sell their equitable ownership in a company to another.
Even if they do so, the problems remain. Finally, unlike the directors that sit on a
current board, shareholders must bear proxy costs without the aid of corporate
finances.298 In response to the SEC’s proposal for shareholder access, and
“[r]eflecting concern over the lack of accountability of corporate directors and
recent corporate scandals, the commenters generally urged the Commission to
adopt rules that would grant shareholders greater access to the nomination process
and greater ability to exercise their rights and responsibilities as owners of their
companies.”299 If so many urged this position and recognize that it could help
solve the problems, why did the SEC refuse to take the steps to make it happen?
For many years, leading scholars have argued that giving shareholders more
opportunities to participate in true corporate governance—nomination of
directors—would provide a more informed investor that could lead to a more
efficient market.300 In a survey done in 1985 of directors at large corporations,
only seven percent stated that their contributions are critical to their respective
companies’ success.301 In this same survey, forty-eight percent of the respondents
said that they expected CEO pay to reach $1 million soon, “and also expected
stockholders to raise a storm when it did.”302 Researchers conducted this survey
on the heels of Smith v. Van Gorkom,303 a case where the Delaware Supreme Court
showed signs of moving towards a system where directors would be more
accountable for their actions.304 Because legislative action shortly after the
decision weakened the effect, as we stand twenty-three years later, CEO pay has
296
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skyrocketed past that estimate, yet the predicted outcry seems to have either never
happened or been ignored.
The market is ready for directors to step up and begin true arms-length
bargaining with executives. One way to ensure this occurs is to allow shareholders
to “purge” boards that continually refuse to act in the shareholders’ best
interests.305 With the threat of removal by shareholders a legitimate threat, boards
would likely exercise more discretion in their dealings with executives. The SEC
did very well in opening the proxy process up to the Internet—a step that would
undoubtedly aid shareholders in their ability to exercise power over the board. As
evidenced by the failure on the part of Congress, through the IRC, and the SEC,
through increasing disclosure rules, reaching directors appears to be the only viable
solution in controlling executive overcompensation. The new chairwoman of the
SEC, Mary Schapiro, stated that she favored pushing for the agency to implement
increased proxy information to allow shareholders to affect board elections.306
Specifically, she said, “Speaking for myself, I believe the SEC has not gone far
enough in this . . . area, and so I intend to make proxy access - meaningful
opportunities for a company’s owners to nominate its directors - a critical part of
the Commission’s agenda in the coming months.”307
D. Implications for the Future
The proxy system is still a very expensive process, and the better solution
would be for the SEC to reverse its recent interpretation of Rule 14a-8(i)(8) and
require companies to include shareholder nominees in company proxy materials.308
After examining the effectiveness of this approach through several proxy seasons,
the SEC could begin working towards a system where shareholders will have
access that is more direct. Some of the catches with any new system, which the
SEC would have to work through, will be working out incompatibilities with old
rules and new rules. These include rules regarding disclosure, ownership trigger
disclosures, and anti-fraud provisions.309 None of which, however, represent an
impediment too difficult to overcome through trial and error. More significantly,
some of the suggested changes could involve the SEC going into areas where
Congress has not delegated it authority.310 If so, this issue could fall upon
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Congress to pass legislation redefining the scope of the Securities Laws to enable
the SEC to work in the best interests of the shareholders. However, of note, the
new chairwoman of the SEC, Mary Schapiro, stated that she favored pushing for
the agency to implement increased proxy information to allow shareholders to
affect board elections.311 Specifically, she said, “Speaking for myself, I believe the
SEC has not gone far enough in this . . . area, and so I intend to make proxy access
- meaningful opportunities for a company’s owners to nominate its directors - a
critical part of the Commission’s agenda in the coming months.”312 It will be
interesting to see if the SEC follows through with this approach.
Only time will tell whether American shareholders will be willing to increase
their activity and be willing to pressure boards of directors to do better jobs
negotiating with executives regarding pay packages. Unfortunately, if the
shareholders were to decide that a change is necessary, the SEC and Congress have
yet to provide the foundation for them to engage in appropriate corporate
governance. We can take the example provided by shareholders in the United
Kingdom as evidence that, given the opportunity, the shareholders would become
more engaged in the governance process.313 If both the SEC and Congress realize
a problem exists, which seems to be the case given their recent activity in the area,
one can only speculate as to when they will decide better steps must be taken for
corrective action. They can begin by giving shareholders the ability to exercise the
power they already own by providing the capital to corporations that are the
backbone of the American economy.
VI. CONCLUSION
Executive overcompensation is a problem in the United States. It has gone
up at rapid paces while corporate profits and rank-and-file salaries have gone
down. The true solution to the problem lies with shareholders and their ability to
exercise control and influence over directors who continually fail to work in the
best interests of the company. The attempts by Congress and the SEC have failed
to provide the effective means for controlling excessive executive compensation
because the IRC and SEC disclosure rules can easily be avoided through good
lawyering and inventive techniques. The SEC could redeem itself, reinterpret its
latest ruling, return power to the shareholders, who will then be more likely to
become active participants in corporate governance, and continue to work towards
solutions to lowering executives’ pay.
The large-block shareholders seem ready to nominate qualified directors who
promise to engage in arms-length bargaining with management. If these directors
promise to control management, and the shareholders have substantial ability to
affect the outcome of the voting at companies’ annual meetings, the larger
shareholders would likely engage in the process. In doing so, the directors would
actually be serving those they are required to by law. This would return the
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compensation decision techniques to one truly driven by the market as opposed to
the monopoly in bargaining power we have today. Even the self-professed
marketeers cannot deny that truth.
The idea that the American economy and publicly held corporations work in
a free market is only partly true. Congress and SEC today exercise stringent
oversight on companies, ensuring each meet listing requirements and other
safeguards, largely because of the events leading to the Great Depression. They
should now allow shareholders to take advantage of the new mediums available to
reverse the long-held corporate governance ideology in the United States. If the
status quo continues, then our problem will persist. I hope that we can target
solutions, as the Apollo 13 crew did, before it is too late, because the consequences
of inaction could be severe.

